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NOTE
Fraud in Commodity Futures Trading-An
Examination of the Investor's Remedies
I. INTRODUCTION
Trading by individual investors in commodity futures con-
tracts1 performs an essential price stabilization function in the dis-
tribution of agricultural and nonagricultural products2 to consum-
ers. By hedging,3 producers, dealers, and processors of commodities
are able to protect themselves from unwanted price fluctuations in
the cash market for the commodity and thereby pass on lower
prices to the consumer. 4 The investor in commodity futures is nec-
essary to absorb the risks the hedgers wish to shift.' As the need
1. "A commodity future is a standardized contract for purchase and sale of a fixed
(usually large) quantity of a commodity of designated grade, for delivery in a specified fu-
ture month, at a price agreed on when the contract is made." Bromberg, Commodities Law
and Securities Law-Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J. CORP. L. 217, 242 (1976). See gener-
ally COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, GLOSSARY OF SoMz TERMS USED IN THE Fu-
Tuns TRADING INDUSTRY 13 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CFTC GLOSSARY].
Futures contracts should be distinguished from cash or forward contracts, which "are
used for merchandising purposes, and may provide for either immediate or deferred deliv-
ery." Valdez, Modernizing the Regulation of the Commodity Futures Markets, 13 HARv. J.
LzOis. 35, 39 (1975). In contrast, "futures trading does not consist of sales of a commodity
for later delivery. It consists, rather, of formation of contracts for later sale of a commod-
ity." Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity for Future Deliv-
ery" in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1175 (1978) (emphasis added).
A futures contract is not bought, sold, or traded in the traditional sense but, instead, is
redeemed or discharged "by offsetting with an equal and opposite futures contract." Id. at
1176. Thus, actual performance of a futures contract-delivery of the specified amount of
the commodity-rarely occurs. Id. at 1177. See note 10 infra.
2. Examples of nonagricultural commodities include precious metals and financial in-
struments. For a list of those commodities currently regulated under the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), see note 43 infra.
3. "Hedging" has been defined as "taking a position in a futures market opposite to a
position held in the cash market to minimize the risk of financial loss from an adverse price
change." CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note 1, at 14. Basically, "anyone wanting protection
against a price decline can achieve it by selling a futures contract, and anyone wanting pro-
tection against a price increase can achieve it by buying a futures contract." Wilmouth,
Introducing the Markets, 35 Bus. LAw. 699, 701 (1980).
4. Valdez, supra note 1, at 40.
5. Id.; Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 288 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. New
York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
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for protection against wide fluctuations in commodity prices in-
creases,6 it is essential that more investors engage in futures trad-
ing. In fact, it has been estimated that in order for the market to
be viable, fifty to seventy-five percent of the volume of futures
trading must come from investors willing to assume risk positions
in the hopes of making a profit.7 At the same time, however, a sub-
stantial risk of loss to the investor is inherent in futures trading
because of low margin requirements and unexpected, volatile price
fluctuations.'
In recent years, the volume of futures trading has increased at
an unprecedented pace. During 1979 alone, 74.3 million futures
contracts were traded, approximately forty-five percent more than
in 1978.9 The dollar figures are even more staggering. A spokesman
for the Chicago Board of Trade, which alone accounts for about
one-half of the total trading volume, estimated that futures trans-
actions on its floor in 1980 would amount to more than one trillion
dollars, an increase from thirty-seven billion dollars ten years
ago.10 Furthermore, the dramatic increase in trading volume also
indicates a greater public participation in the futures markets.
Unfortunately, as more private individuals speculate in com-
modity futures, the potential for unethical and fraudulent business
practices also enlarges considerably.' Although typically more so-
6. A dramatic increase in the volatility of cash prices has occurred during the past ten
years. For example, "grain prices that once fluctuated in an annual range of dimes per
bushel now fluctuate in dollars per bushel. And even that is fairly tame compared with what
has been happening recently to silver and gold prices, and also, for that matter, to interest
rates." Wilmouth, supra note 3, at 701.
7. Johnston, Understanding the Dynamics of Commodity Trading: A Success Story,
35 Bus. LAw. 705, 708-09 (1980).
8. Saitlin, Exclusive CFTC Jurisdiction of Commodity Trading Vehicles May Depend
Upon Form Over Substance, 33 Bus. LAw. 241, 242 (1977).
As a result of low margin requirements of typically 10 per cent or less of the con-
tract value necessary to initially secure positions in the commodity markets, commod-
ity trading traditionally features broad market fluctuation resulting in dramatic profits
and losses. It is possible for a $10,000 speculator to double or even triple his invest-
ment in a short time frame or to suffer losses of two or three times his initial margin.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. COMMODITY FuTuRs TRADING ComhussIoN ANNUAL REPORT 70 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as 1979 ANN. REP.]. Ten years earlier, in 1969, only 10.3 million futures contracts were
traded. Id.
10. Wilmouth, supra note 3, at 702. It should be noted, however, that "dollar value"
represents the value of futures transactions made, not the value of deliveries actually made
on all futures contracts traded. See note 1 supra. "[F]ewer than 3% of all futures contracts
culminate with the delivery of the actual goods against the contract." 1 CoMm. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 301.
11. Statement by the President on Signing the [Commodity Futures Trading] Act [of
1350 [Vol. 34:1349
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phisticated than investors in securities, the individual investor in
commodity futures often lacks knowledge of and experience in the
intricacies of commodity futures trading.1" Therefore, he enters
into an investment vehicle such as an discretionary account,1
which places control over all trades in the hands of the broker. In
this arrangement, an unscrupulous broker could easily deceive an
unwary investor by engaging in fraudulent activities such as mis-
representing the status of the account or churning.14 While the in-
dividual investor suffers financial loss, consumers often bear the
ultimate burden of increased commodity prices that result from
fraudulent and manipulative futures transactions. 5
This Note examines the various avenues of redress available to
the defrauded commodity futures investor. Initially, an examina-
tion of two remedies expressly provided in the Commodity Ex-
change Act (CEA) 1 -- reparations and arbitration-demonstrates
their current inefficiencies and inadequacies.17 Next, the Note con-
siders the possibility of recovery under the antifraud provision of
the Securities Exchange Act18 and argues that such a cause of ac-
tion should still be available when the investor can show that the
particular discretionary trading account is a security."5 Finally, a
discussion of an implied private right of action for violations of the
antifraud provision of the CEA20 reveals much confusion and dis-
pute about its existence and concludes that it should not be per-
mitted at the present time.21 Ultimately, this Note suggests that
1974] Into Law, While Expressing Reservations About Certain of Its Provisions, 10 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1366, 1367 (Oct. 24, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Statement].
12. Note, Discretionary Accounts as "Securities": Applying the Howey Investment
Contract Test to a New Investment Medium, 67 GEo. L.J. 269, 269 (1978). For a discussion
of a typical transaction in commodity futures trading, see Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283,
287 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct.
1346 (1981).
13. A discretionary account is "[a]n arrangement by which the holder of the account
gives written power of attorney to someone else, often his broker, to buy and sell without
prior approval of the holder." CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note 1, at 10. This type of investment
vehicle is "often referred to as the 'managed account' or Controlled Account." Id.
14. "Churning" of an account occurs when a broker or other account representative
engages in excessive trades for the sole purpose of increasing his commissions.
15. Statement, supra note 11, at 1367.
16. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).
17. See part H infra.
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10b, 15 U.S. § 78j(b) (1976).
19. See part II infra.
20. Commodity Exchange Act § 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976). For the text of this provision,
see note 35 infra.
21. See part IV infra.
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the uncertainty surrounding these possible methods of recovery de-
mands that Congress give further consideration to these issues."
II. ExPREss REMEDIES UNDER THE CEA
A. Development of Commodity Futures Regulation
Since the first federal legislation regulating commodity futures
trading, the Future Trading Act,23 Congress has attempted periodi-
cally to strengthen supervision and control over the burgeoning
commodity futures markets. Designed primarily to protect grain
farmers from price manipulation," the Future Trading Act 5 estab-
lished a system of centralized trading on designated, self-regulating
contract markets,26 which has characterized all subsequent com-
modity futures legislation.17 Because the Future Trading Act im-
posed a tax on grain futures not traded on designated exchanges to
force compliance with its regulations, the Suppeme Court ruled
that the legislation was an unconstitutional exercise of the federal
251taxing power. In response, Congress promulgated the Grain Fu-
tures Act,2 '9 which prohibited a person from dealing in futures on a
board of trade not federally licensed.30
Inadequacies in the Grain Futures Act and the experience of
22. See part V infra. State causes of action for fraud, negligence, breach of contract,
and breach of fiduciary duty may be available to the injured futures investor. A discussion
of these potential claims, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
23. Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (superseded 1922). For an overview of commodity fu-
tures regulation, see Johnson, The Changing Face of Commodity Regulation, 20 PRAc.
LAW., Dec. 1974, at 27, 35-42.
24. Bromberg, supra note 1, at 288.
25. Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (superseded 1922).
26. The Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to classify a "board of trade" as a
"contract market" if it provided for prevention of manipulation of prices. Future Trading
Act, ch. 86, § 5(d), 42 Stat. 188 (1921) (superseded 1922). Although subject to Department
of Agriculture supervision, responsibility for enforcing antimanipulative measures was, as a
practical matter, vested in the exchanges themselves. Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d
774, 778-79 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981)
(No. 80-1542). A "board of trade" is currently defined as "any exchange or association,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, of persons who shall be engaged in the business of
buying or selling commodity or receiving the same for sale on consignment." 7 U.S.C. § 2
(Supp. 11 1979). To qualify for designation as a "contract market," a board of trade must
now meet the requirements enumerated in 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
27. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 293 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. New
York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
28. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
29. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
30. The Grain Futures Act survived constitutional scrutiny in Board of Trade v. Ol-
sen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). See also Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 778 n. 8 (5th Cir.
1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No. 80-1542).
1352
1981] COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 1353
the Great Depression prompted Congress to enact the Commodity
Exchange Act of 193631 Designed to bolster regulation of commod-
ity futures trading, the CEA expanded the scope of the commodi-
ties subject to regulation beyond grain futures to include cotton,
butter, and eggs.32 In addition, Congress empowered the Commod-
ity Exchange Commission"3 to establish quantitative limits on
speculative trading in futures." The CEA also added an antifraud
provision3 5 and established registration requirements for both fu-
tures commission merchants" and floor brokers,37 the individuals
31. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §9 1-24 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)).
32. Johnson, supra note 23, at 35.
33. The Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney Gen-
eral composed the Commodity Exchange Commission. Ch. 545, § 3(b), 49 Stat. 1492 (1936).
34. Id. The limitation provision is currently contained in § 4a of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. §
6a (1976).
35. The antifraud provision adopted in 1936 has been retained in essentially the same
form and currently reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market... or (2) for any
person, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making of, any contract of
sale of any commodity for future delivery made, or to be made, on or subject to the
rules of any contract market, for or on behalf of any other person...
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report or
statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person any
false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means
whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution of
any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with respect
to such order or contract for such person; or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset against the order or orders
of any other person, or willfully and knowingly and without the prior consent of such
person to become the buyer in respect to any selling order of such person, or become
the seller in respect to any buying order of such person.
Nothing in this section or in any other section of this chapter shall be construed to
prevent a futures commission merchant or floor broker who shall have in hand, simul-
taneously, buying and selling orders at the market for different principals for a like
quantity of a commodity for future delivery in the same month, from executing such
buying and selling orders at the market price: Provided, That any such execution shall
take place on the floor of the exchange where such orders are to be executed at public
outcry across the ring and shall be duly reported, recorded, and cleared in the same
manner as other orders executed on such exchange: And provided further, That such
transactions shall be made in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may promulgate regarding the manner of the execution of such transactions.
Commodity Exchange Act § 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976).
36. Futures commission merchants are "individuals, associations, partnerships, corpo-
rations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any
commodity for future delivery on ... any contract market." Commodity Exchange Act 9
2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 11 1979). Their registration requirements are contained in §9
4d, 4f, 4k and 8a of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d, 6f, 6k, 12a (1976 & Supp. H 1979).
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who actually execute the trades.
In defining the objective of the CEA, Congress stated, "The
fundamental purpose of the measure is to insure fair practice and
honest dealing on the commodity exchanges and to provide a mea-
sure of control over those forms of speculative activity which too
often demoralize the markets to the injury of producers and con-
sumers and the exchanges themselves."38 Thus, the CEA not only
addressed the shortcomings of the Grain Futures Act; it also
demonstrated a shift in congressional attitude from viewing com-
modity exchanges as primarily agricultural entities to a recognition
of their importance as investment institutions. 9 Therefore, by
1936 Congress had acknowledged both the importance of the indi-
vidual investor in futures trading and his need for protection.
In contrast to the quite limited amendments to the CEA
adopted in 1968,40 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 197441 (1974 Amendments) thoroughly revised the Act. The
revolutionary nature of the 1974 Amendments is further indication
37. A floor broker is defined as "any person who, in or surrounding any 'pit,' 'ring,'
'post,' or other place provided by a contract market.. . shall purchase or sell for any other
person any commodity for future delivery on... any contract market." Commodity Ex-
change Act § 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1I 1979). Their registration requirements are
contained in §§ 4e, 4f, and 8a of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 5f, 6e, 12a (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
A futures commission merchant transmits orders, on behalf of its customer, to one of its
floor brokers at the exchange. The floor broker carries out the order and then relays it to the
futures commission merchant.
38. H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935), cited in Leist v. Simplot, 638
F.2d 283, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist,
101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
This purpose provision currently reads as follows:
Transactions in commodity involving the sale thereof for future delivery as com-
monly conducted on boards of trade known as "futures" are affected with a national
public interest... ; the transactions and prices of commodity on such boards of trade
are susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control, and sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations in the prices thereof frequently occur as a result of such speculation, ma-
nipulation, or control, which are detrimental to the producer or the consumer and the
persons handling commodity and products and byproducts thereof in interstate com-
merce, and such fluctuations in prices are an obstruction to and a burden upon inter-
state commerce in commodity. . . and render regulation imperative for the protection
of such commerce and the national public interest therein.
Commodity Exchange Act § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
39. Johnson, supra note 23, at 35.
40. Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26 and Pub. L. 90-418, 82 Stat. 413 (1968) (codified in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. M 1979)). The 1968 Amendments
added two new commodities to the scope of the Commodity Exchange Act- live cattle and
pork bellies. In addition, the antifraud provision was extended to a broader class of persons.
Johnson, supra note 23, at 36.
41. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24
(1976 & Supp. 11 1979)).
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of congressional recognition that the futures industry is growing
both in volume and complexity and that the industry's self-regula-
tion neither adequately curbed market abuses nor protected inves-
tors.'2 First, Congress greatly expanded the coverage of the Act to
encompass all types of futures contracts, including precious metals
and financial instruments.43 Second, the 1974 Amendments estab-
lished the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), an
independent regulatory agency modeled after the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)," as the keystone of the new federal
regulatory structure,'5 and thereby divested supervisory control
from the Department of Agriculture.4'6 Third, the mandate of the
CFTC included exclusive jurisdiction over regulation of futures
trading47 and responsibility for enforcement of the CEA, including
42. Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 779-80 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert.
filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No. 80-1542).
43. The all-inclusive definition of "commodity" reads as follows:
The word "commodity" shall mean wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed,
grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool,
wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cotton seed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil
and all other fats and oil), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean
meal, livestock, live-stock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and all other
goods and articles, except onions... and all services, rights, and interests in which
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.
Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. I 1979) (emphasis added).
44. See S. RsP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1974).
45. Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 780 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert.
filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No. 80-1542).
46. The CFTC is composed of five individuals knowledgeable in futures trading and
appointed by the President. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a) (Supp. I
1979). The powers and duties of the CFTC are set forth in § 2(a)(2)-(11) of the CEA, 7
U.S.C. § 4a (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). For a discussion of the legislative history of the CFTC,
see Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public Pol-
icy, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1, 5-31 (1976).
47. Section 2(a)(1) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. m1 1979) provides, in part, that
"the [CFTC] shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements... and
transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery." (emphasis ad-
ded). It is generally agreed that the CFTC's authority to regulate commodity futures trad-
ing has preempted other governmental agencies, including the SEC, with a potential interest
in regulating the field.
In addition, the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments reveals that the jurisdiction
provision was "an attempt to avoid unnecessary overlapping and duplicative regulation"
between the CFTC and the SEC. 120 CONG. Rc. 34736 (1974). See Johnson, supra note 46,
at 7-31. See also Greenstone, The CFTC and Government Reorganization: Preserving Reg-
ulatory Independence, 33 Bus. LAw. 163 (1977). Congress preserved the regulatory jurisdic-
tion of the SEC and other governmental agencies to the extent that it did not interfere with
the exclusive province of the CFTC: "[Eixcept as hereinabove provided, nothing contained
in this section shall (i) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the
[SEC] or other regulatory authorities.., or (ii) restrict the [SEC] and such other authori-
ties from carrying out their duties and responsibilities .... ." Commodity Exchange Act §
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the power to bring actions to enjoin violations of the CEA,48 to
issue cease and desist orders, and to compel exchanges to adopt
additional rules. 49 The insertion of a savings clause, however, pre-
served federal and state court jurisdiction.50 Last, Congress created
an administrative dispute settlement procedure-
reparations 51-and required individual contract markets to estab-
lish arbitration procedures to handle investors' grievances. 2
The comprehensive changes of the 1974 Amendments were af-
firmed and somewhat refined when Congress examined the CFTC
under "sunset review"53 in 1978 and reauthorized the agency for
another four years.5 4 The Futures Trading Act of 1978 (1978
Amendments)55 added a parens patriae provision to the CEA that
enabled states to bring suit in federal court on behalf of their citi-
zens to enforce compliance with the CEA.5 e Among other revisions,
2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1I 1979). Although Congress intended to clarify the problem of
overlapping jurisdiction between the SEC and the CFTC with the exclusive jurisdiction pro-
vision, its precise meaning is nevertheless uncertain. See Greenstone, supra, at 201-12;
Guttman, The Futures Trading Act of 1978: The Reaffirmation of CFTC-SEC Coordinated
Jurisdiction over Security/Commodities, 28 AM. U.L. Rv. 1, 4 (1978).
For a discussion of the effect of the exclusive jurisdiction clause on recovery under the
Securities Exchange Act, see notes 141-158 infra and accompanying text.
48. Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1976).
49. Commodity Exchange Act § 6(a), 7 U.S.C. § 8 (Supp. HI 1979).
50. "Nothing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on
courts of the United States or any State." Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2
(Supp. IH 1979).
51. Commodity Exchange Act § 14, 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979). See notes
60-73 infra and accompanying text.
52. Commodity Exchange Act § 5a(11), 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) (Supp. m 1979). See notes
87-91 infra.
53. "Sunset" is the name given to the statutory method of forcing a legislature to
make a periodic examination of a program or agency and a determination of whether it
should continue. Young, A Test of Federal Sunset: Congressional Reauthorization of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 27 EMORY L.J. 853, 854 (1978). In establishing
the CFTC in 1974, Congress provided only temporary authorization for the agency's activi-
ties, requiring an extensive evaluation of the CFTC after four years. Id. at 853.
54. "This legislation extends appropriation authority for the Commodity Exchange
Act to strengthen regulation of the Nation's highly volatile futures trading industry and to
improve the administration of the Commission." Statement on Signing S.2391 Into Law, 14
WEEKLY Comp. oF PREs. Doc. 1696 (Oct. 2, 1978).
55. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. M 1979)).
56. The parens patriae doctrine, permitting sovereigns to take action to protect those
citizens who are unable to take care of themselves, originated in the English feudal system.
The present-day parens patriae remedy allows a state to bring civil actions on behalf of its
citizens to enforce certain laws and to recover damages. Lower, State Enforcement of the
Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1061-63 (1978). Under § 6d of the CEA, a
state attorney general or other designated state official is empowered to institute suits seek-
ing monetary or injunctive relief in a federal district court on behalf of the state's residents
1356
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the 1978 Amendments increased criminal penalties for violations of
certain provisions of the CEA from $100,000 to $500,000.11 In 1982,
the CFTC is again scheduled for critical reexamination and reeval-
uation under sunset review. If the trend of periodic amendments to
the CEA continues, Congress will undoubtedly consider additional
measures or modifications of existing provisions that will provide
more protection for the commodity futures investor. This Note
next examines the remedies currently available to the investor
under the CEA.
B. Express Remedies
Although the antifraud provision of the CEA does not provide
an express private right of action for recovery by a defrauded com-
modity futures investor, he may seek damages within the procedu-
ral framework of the CFTC58 for any violation of the Act commit-
ted by his broker.59 The CEA expressly provides for two remedies:
Reparations and arbitration.
1. Reparations
The 1974 Amendments created a "formal complaint procedure
before the [CFTC] for the adjudication of grievances which result
from violations of the Act."60 Section 14 of the CEA61 sets forth
the guidelines for reparations-the administrative procedure
through which a defrauded or otherwise injured commodity futures
investor may seek recovery. The investor must file a complaint
with the CFTC alleging a violation of the CEA, or a rule, regula-
tion, or order issued thereunder, by a futures commission
merchant, floor broker, commodity trading advisor, 2 or commodity
against any person other than a contract market, clearing house, or floor broker for alleged
violations of the statute or of the CFTC's rules and regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (Supp. M
1979).
57. Commodity Exchange Act § 6b, 7 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. 11 1979).
58. See notes 60-73, 87-91 infra and accompanying text.
59. Liability for violations of the CEA is not confined to a "broker." For example, the
liability of a principal for acts of his agent in violation of the CEA is set forth in Commodity
Exchange Act § 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
60. H.R. Rap. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 22 (1974).
61. 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (Supp. I 1979).
62. As defined under Section 2(a)(1) of the CEA a "commodity trading advisor" is
any person who, for compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising others,
either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of commodities or as
to the advisability of trading in any commodity for future delivery... or who for
compensation or profit, and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analy-
ses or reports concerning commodities.
135719811
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pool operator6" who is registered or required to be registered under
the CEA.6 4 If the CFTC determines that the facts warrant action,
it forwards a copy of the petition to the alleged violator who must
answer within a reasonable time. 5 The CFTC then conducts an
investigation and may afford the alleged violator the opportunity
for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.6 Hearings,
however, are not required when the claims amount to less than five
thousand dollars.6 7 The findings of the Administrative Law Judge
are subject to review by the CFTC upon its own motion or upon
application of the dissatisfied party."
Once the procedures of the CFTC are exhausted and the de-
termination of liability is made, 9 the commission then determines
the amount of damages suffered and orders the offender to pay the
sum to the complainant.70 The complainant may apply to a federal
district court for enforcement if his award is not paid within the
specified time7 1 and failure to pay a reparations order may result
in an automatic suspension of the violator's license.72 A reparations
order issued by the CFTC is reviewable in federal appellate court
7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. III 1979).
63. As defined under § 2(a)(1) of the CEA, a "commodity pool operator" is,
Any person engaged in a business which is of the nature of an investment trust, syndi-
cate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits, accepts,
or receives from others, funds, securities, or property, either directly or through capital
contributions, the sale of stock or other forms of securities, or otherwise, for the pur-
pose of trading in any commodity for future delivery.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. III 1979).
64. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(a), 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (Supp. II 1979). The 1974
Amendments were unclear whether reparations proceedings could be initiated against those
who were required to register but did not do so. The 1978 Amendments clarified this issue
by including in the class of potential defendants in a reparations proceeding "any person
who is either registered or required to be registered" under the Commodity Exchange Act.
Schneider & Santo, Commodity Futures Trading Commission: A Review of the 1978 Legis-
lation, 34 Bus. LAw. 1755, 1758 (1979) (emphasis added).
65. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(a), 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (Supp. I1 1979); 17 C.F.R. §§
12.21-.24 (1980).
66. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(b), 7 U.S.C. § 18(b) (Supp. I1 1979); 17 C.F.R. §§
12.25, 12.51, 12.71-.90 (1980).
67. Id.
68. Review by the CFTC, in any circumstance, is available only at the discretion of the
Commission. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(b), 7 U.S.C. § 18(b) (Supp. 1I 1979); 17 C.F.R.
§ 12.101 (1980). See Graham, Special "Reparations" Actions, 35 Bus. LAw. 773, 774 (1980).
For a thorough discussion of the reparations procedure, see Rosen, Reparations Proceedings
under the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1978).
69. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(c), 7 U.S.C. § 18(c) (Supp. 1I 1979).
70. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(e), 7 U.S.C. § 18(e) (1976).
71. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(f), 7 U.S.C. § 18(f) (1976).
72. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(h), 7 U.S.C. § 18(h) (1976).
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upon petition of the dissatisfied party."
The reparations procedure of the CEA as enforced by the
CFTC is not unlike administrative proceedings before other gov-
ernment agencies.7" Because the agency must perform conflicting
roles, the reparations remedy may not meet due process standards.
An inherent and pervasive "undue process" exists at the CFTC and all com-
parable agencies when the Commission itself is rule maker, policeman, grand
jury, prosecutor, judge and jury with de novo powers in the same case at vir-
tually the same time. The agency has "heard" your case at least three and
perhaps more times before you have a hearing. The minds of men are simply
not supple enough to judge a defendant's culpability fairly when vindication
of the Commission's own prosecution and reputation are also at stake in an
adversarial proceeding.7 5
Other procedural limitations of the reparations proceeding
also distinguish it from a proceeding in a traditional civil cause of
action. Only those claims arising under the CEA can be adjudi-
cated by the CFTC; therefore state statutory or common-law
causes of action such as fraud, negligence, or breach of contract are
outside the commission's jurisdiction. Limited discovery and re-
laxed evidentiary requirements characterize the hearings, 7  and the
general standards of care developed by the Administrative Law
Judges are rarely reviewed by either the CFTC or appellate
courts. Furthermore, judicial review of a CFTC determination in
a specific reparations proceeding is limited. An aggrieved party
may not apply to a federal district court for a trial de novo. He
may appeal, however, to a United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, 7  but the findings of fact made in the agency proceeding are
73. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(g), 7 U.S.C. § 18(g) (1976).
74. Graham, supra note 68, at 774.
75. Bagley, Introduction: A New Body of Law in an Era of Industry Growth, 27 EM-
ORY L.J. 849, 851 (1978). See also Valdez, supra note 1, at 61.
76. The permitted methods of discovery include the production of documents and tan-
gible things, depositions upon written interrogatories, and admissions 17 C.F.R. §§ 12.62-.65
(1980). Evidence standards are contained in 17 C.F.R. § 12.80 (1980).
[T]he problem with the reparations is, it is very sloppy, to put it bluntly. In federal
court your have a very tight evidentiary practice and hearings .... In reparations, the
only objections that are generally sustained are the breaks for lunch. Most of the time
the [Administrative Law Judges] will permit anything and everything to come in before
them.
Nastro, Remedies & Redress in Commodity Disputes: Recourse in the Courts, 35 Bus. LAw.
765, 768 (1980).
77. "We [commodity lawyers] know what they [Administrative Law Judges] are say-
ing, but we do not know whether the [CFTC] will uphold them; nor do we know whether the
appellate courts will uphold them.... [There has not yet been a substantive appellate
court decision." Nastro, supra note 76, at 769-70.
78. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(g), 7 U.S.C. § 18(g) (1976). In some similar repara-
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conclusive if substantiated by the evidence.79 Two additional re-
quirements may discourage a person from seeking an appeal to a
circuit-court: The appellant must post a bond equal to twice the
amount of the reparations award and, should he not prevail, he
must pay reasonable attorney's fees to the appellee5 0
In addition to the potential violations of due process, difficul-
ties in administration have also plagued the reparations remedy.
Experience during the past six years has demonstrated the inabil-
ity of the CFTC to provide investors with an efficient and inexpen-
sive method to adjudicate their claims through the reparations
proceeding.81 First, the inherent complexity82 and length of the
reparations procedure has created an overwhelming backlog of
cases before the CFTC.83 For example, in 1979 the Hearings Sec-
tion of the CFTC closed only 174 of the 535 reparations complaints
forwarded to it. By the end of 1979, 740 reparations cases were
pending although the procedure has been available only since
1979.8 Second, an inexperienced staff at the CFTC and inadequate
planning since the inception of the reparations program have been
major factors in the failures of the reparations remedy.8 5 Last, only
four Administrative Law Judges are available to preside over the
reparations hearings, and the Chief Administrative Law Judge has
tions proceedings before other agencies, however, there is a right to de novo review in fed-
eral district court. Graham, supra note 68, at 774.
79. Graham, supra note 68, at 774-75.
80. Commodity Exchange Act § 14(g), 7 U.S.C. § 18(g) (1976).
81. Rosen, supra note 68, at 1055.
82. Approximately one-half of the reparations cases involve complex commodity op-
tions transactions, further contributing to delay. Graham, supra note 68, at 775. Commodity
"options" are "call options to buy a designated commodity futures contract at a given price
within a specified period, put options to sell, and double (or straddle options to do either)."
Bromberg, supra note 1, at 257.
83. Rosen, supra note 68, at 1055.
84. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 29. The following chart demonstrates the devel-
opment of the case backlog before the Hearing Section of the CFTC.
Docketed Closed Pending
1976 25 0 25
1977 319 70 274
1978 303 198 379
1979 535 174 740
Id.
85. See Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Research and General Legislation of the Senate
Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (pt. 1), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 29, 38-39
(1978). See also Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1981, at 8, col. 2. "Since its creation in 1974, the [CFTC]
has been ridiculed and opposed by the freewheeling futures industry as understaffed, inex-
perienced and occasionally bumbling." Id.
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estimated that each judge can handle only twenty-five to fifty rep-
arations cases per year.86
2. Arbitration
The 1974 Amendments require all contract markets to provide
an informal and impartial procedure "through arbitration or other-
wise"'8 7 to resolve investor claims against any of its members" or
employees. The arbitration procedure is voluntary and results in
compulsory payment only upon agreement of the parties.89 To en-
sure objectivity, the customer may choose an arbitration panel
composed of a majority who are not associated with the contract
market.90 A registered futures association must also provide a simi-
lar noncompulsory dispute settlement device.9 1
Although theoretically the arbitration procedure should pro-
vide for an unbiased, rapid resolution of investor grievances by
knowledgeable arbitrators, several limitations are inherent in the
process. First, a predispute arbitration agreement is invalid unless
it complies with several specific requirements established by the
CFTC.92 Second, arbitration is not available for claims in excess of
fifteen thousand dollars.93 Third, a variety of other arbitration fo-
rums are available94 in addition to panels on the commodity ex-
86. SUBCOMM. ON AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELoPMENT AND RELATED AGENCIES, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., INVESTIGATIVE STUDY OF THE COMMODrrY FUTURES TRDING COmaSSION 112
(Comm. Print 1978). See generally Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus
on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 AD. L. REv. 109, 130 (1981).
87. Commodity Exchange Act § 5a(Il), 7 U.S.C. § 7a(Il) (Supp. HI 1979); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 180.2, 180.3 (1980). The alternatives to arbitration include "delegation to a registered
futures association having rules providing for such procedures." 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) (Supp. M
1979). The "otherwise" language allows the contract market to fashion alternative methods
of relief.
88. A member of a contract market "include[s] individuals, associations, partnerships,
corporations, and trusts owning or holding membership in, or admitted to membership rep-
resentation on, a contract market or given members' trading privileges thereon." Commod-
ity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1I 1979).
89. Commodity Exchange Act § 5(a)(11), 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) (Supp. 11 1979).
90. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2(a) (1980).
91. Commodity Exchange Act § 17(b)(10), 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10) (Supp. HI 1979).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1980). For example, the notice requirements for a predispute
arbitration agreement include, inter alia, (1) it cannot be a condition precedent to engaging
the broker's services; (2) it must be contained in a separate document executed by the cus-
tomer, or in a separately endorsed clause within the customer/broker contract; (3) it must
include warnings in bold print that caution the investor that by signing the agreement he
may be waiving his right to sue in a court of law, and (4) the warning statement must state
that resort to the reparations procedure is not waived by signing the agreement. Id.
93. Commodity Exchange Act § 5(a)(11), 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10) (Supp. m 1979).
94. See Nastro, supra note 76, at 767-68. "Everyone thinks that you walk into an arbi-
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changes. Fourth, some members of the commodity exchange
panels, although impartial, may be inexperienced in the intricacies
of commodity futures trading.9 5 Fifth, virtually no opportunity ex-
ists for prearbitration discovery of the opponent's case. 6 Sixth, ar-
bitration panels follow a loose standard of evidence. Seventh, the
panels have few binding legal precedents to look to for guidance. 8
Eighth, there is no appeal from the arbitrator's decisions to any
other entity within the contract market.9 9 Last, although the
CFTC encourages arbitration, the agency allows the investor to
first pursue the reparations procedure."' Because of all of these
limitations, arbitration is seldom invoked.
C. Analysis
Neither of the two remedial procedures contained in the
CEA-reparations and arbitration-provide an adequate opportu-
nity for the resolution of customer claims and grievances. Each is
limited in scope and contains several deficiencies. 10 1 The inade-
quacy of the current remedial procedures of the CEA, however,
does not justify abandonment of the system.102 An efficient and
well-managed administrative system of resolving the claims of in-
jured commodity futures investors is a desirable alternative to ju-
dicial remedies. It is both unnecessary and counterproductive to
increase the already stifling backlog in civil courts with the addi-
tion of claims that properly should be adjudicated before the
CFTC. Instead, when the CEA is subjected to sunset review in
1982, Congress should critically examine and amend the current
procedures to provide the injured investor with more efficient and
equitable methods to satisfy his claims."0" Until then, however, the
tration forum and the industry is there, ready to give you five minutes of their time, and
simply render an award dismissing the complaint. That is not true." Id. at 767. Most often,
an exchange panel will only arbitrate disputes arising out of that particular contract market.
The majority of arbitration agreements however, call for arbitration before the American
Arbitration Association, the New York Stock Exchange, or the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers, particularly for more complex claims. Id. at 767, 770.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 768.
97. Id. See note 76 supra.
98. Frankhauser & Selig, Private Actions Under the Commodity Exchange Act: Im-
plying Less and Enjoying It More, 35 Bus. LAw. 847, 861 (1980).
99. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2(f) (1980).
100. Nastro, supra note 76, at 767.
101. See notes 74-86, 92-100 supra and accompanying text.
102. See Graham, supra note 68, at 775.
103. Removal of cases involving options transactions from the reparations forum is a
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investor must seek relief within the existing system, or, as this
Note next discusses, under the federal securities laws or through
an implied private right of action under the CEA.
IH. RECOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAws
In addition to the avenues of redress explicitly provided in the
CEA, under certain circumstances a defrauded commodity futures
investor may seek recovery under the federal securities laws. Spe-
cifically, the investor may claim that commodity futures are sub-
ject to the well-established judicial remedy10 of an implied cause
of action under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.10 5 The futures investor gains several advantages if he
can assert a claim for redress under the federal securities laws.
First, since there is a substantial body of securities case law con-
cerning fraud and misrepresentation, the outcome of a suit brought
under the securities laws is more predictable.110 Second, federal se-
curities regulation was designed principally for the protection of
investors and thus contains a number of "pro-plaintiff" features,
including a lighter burden of proof, liberal damages, and nation-
wide service of process. 107 Last, after establishing that registration
requirements were not met,108 an investor may recover the full
value of his account.109 Before the investor may assert his claims
under the securities law, however, he must show that his particular
commodity futures trading vehicle should be classified a security.
A. Discretionary Account-A Security?
Although it is well established that a commodity futures con-
tract alone does not constitute a "security," 110 certain discretionary
accounts in futures may qualify for treatment as securities. There
possible solution to the problem of delay. Id. A discussion of the procedures that Congress
should adopt in order to improve the CEA is beyond the scope of this Note.
104. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
105. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
106. See Saitlin, supra note 8, at 243.
107. Bromberg, Securities Law-Relationship to Commodities Law, 35 Bus. LAw. 787,
795 (1980). Other pro-plaintiff features include the "burden of proof shifted to the defen-
dant in some causes of action.... broad venue, control person liability, and aiding and
abetting concepts." Id. See also Bromberg, supra note 1, at 288.
108. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
109. See Note, supra note 12, at 273.
110. Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (contracts to purchase sugar for future delivery were not securities within
the meaning of the securities laws).
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are three general types of discretionary trading accounts:111 (1) A
pool of funds supplied by a number of investors having a common
trading objective invested by a broker for their common benefit,
(2) a joint account between the broker and his customer in which
the broker conducts all transactions and receives a share of the
profits, and (3) the investment of the customer's money at the dis-
cretion of a broker who earns commissions on each trade irrespec-
tive of whether a profit is made.112 If a discretionary trading
account constitutes an "investment contract," it is treated as a se-
curity under the Securities Exchange Act.11 3
The Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey 4 set forth a
three-part test for characterizing a particular financial vehicle as a
security. An "investment contract" requires (1) an investment of
money, (2) in a "common enterprise," (3) with an expectation that
profits will be derived from the efforts of a promoter or another
third party.11 5 The Court noted that the flexible concept of a "se-
curity" made the term applicable to many varied financial
schemes.118 The Howey test has been used to define an investment
contract under both the 1933 and 1934 securities statutes.117 In ap-
plying the Howey test the Court has indicated that the economic
reality of the disputed investment rather than its form is central to
111. For a definition of a discretionary trading account, see note 13 supra.
112. This categorization of discretionary accounts into three types was suggested in
Note, Discretionary Accounts, 32 U. Miw L. REv. 401, 403-04 (1977).
113. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976), includes
"investment contract" in its definition of a "security." Substantially the same definition is
contained in § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(1976).
It is commonly agreed that the non-discretionary account, in which the investor retains
some control over trading decisions, is not a security. See, e.g., Walsh v. International Pre-
cious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 872 (D. Utah 1981); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1351 (D. Nev. 1980).
114. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Court in Howey held that the offering of units of a
citrus grove development together with service agreements constituted an "investment con-
tract" under § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976), and, thus, was
subject to registration requirements of § 5 thereunder, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
115. 328 U.S. at 301.
116. "It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adap-
tation to meet the countless and variable schemes by those who seek the use of the money
of others on the promise of profits." Id. at 299.
117. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967). In Tcherepnin the
Court held that withdrawable capital shares in a savings and loan association constituted
investment contracts. Thus, the Court used the Howey test to imply a private cause of ac-
tion for alleged false and misleading statements under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Howey
itself was a case under the Securities Act of 1933. See note 114 supra.
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the determination of what is a security." 8
The application of the Howey test to discretionary accounts in
commodity futures has resulted in inconsistent conclusions con-
cerning whether such accounts are "investment contracts" and
therefore "securities."11 9 The first element of the test, an invest-
ment of money, is easily fulfilled. Judicial examination of the com-
mon enterprise requirement, however, has produced much disa-
greement. The dispute over what constitutes a common enterprise
concerns whether the vertical relationship between a broker and
his client is sufficient or whether a horizontal relationship among
many investors is necessary to fulfill the second prong of the
Howey test. The third element, expectation of profits through the
efforts of others, is dependent upon the resolution of the common
enterprise element.
Satisfaction of the common enterprise requirement of the
Howey test, according to one commentator, requires the presence
of one or more of the following fact patterns:
(1)[A] profit-sharing arrangement between the broker and his individual cus-
tomer, (2) a pattern of trading in a uniform manner for all of the accounts
managed by the broker, (3) a predetermined profit-sharing arrangement with
other accounts managed by the same broker, [or] (4) a pooling of funds with
other similar situated investors for a common objective.120
A majority of decisions, however, insist that only a finding of hori-
zontal commonality among a number of investors satisfies the com-
mon enterprise requirement. For example, the Sixth Circuit de-
fined a horizontal common enterprise as a relationship that ties the
fortunes of each member of a group of investors to the success or
failure of the overall venture."2 Therefore, the requirement of a
horizontal relationship precludes the designation of a contract be-
tween a single investor and his broker as a security.
In the leading case espousing the horizontal test, Milnarik v.
M-S Commodities, Inc.,22 the Seventh Circuit was unable to find
the requisite commonality and, therefore, denied recovery under
118. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
119. Compare, e.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) with SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th
Cir. 1974). See generally Note, supra note 12, at 275-82.
120. Hodes & Dreyfus, Discretionary Trading Accounts in Commodity Futures-Are
They Securities?, 30 Bus. LAw. 99, 110 (1974).
121. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 224 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
122. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
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the federal securities laws. 123 The plaintiff invested in a typical dis-
cretionary account: trading was at the broker's discretion, funds
were not commingled with accounts of other investors, and the
broker received a commission on each trade without regard to the
profits. The court held that a commodity futures investor who
granted discretionary' authority to his broker merely created an
agency relationship which did not join the broker's other custom-
ers with similar discretionary accounts in the kind of common en-
terprise required to constitute an investment contract.12 The court
thus suggested that only a pooling of investor interests could sat-
isfy the second prong of the Howey test. The district court in Was-
nowic v. Chicago Board of Trade12 5 applied the Milnarik standard
of a common enterprise and held that a similar discretionary ac-
count arrangement, without any pooling of funds or indicia of joint
enterprise, did not constitute a security. In Hirk v. Agri-Research
Council, Inc.12 6 the Seventh Circuit expanded the Milnarik stan-
dard and held that even a profit splitting arrangement in which
the broker received twenty-five percent of the accrued profits did
not satisfy the common enterprise requirement.
The Sixth Circuit stringently applied the Milnarik horizontal
commonality standard in Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.127 when it denied recovery under the federal securi-
ties laws to plaintiffs who had opened discretionary accounts in the
defendant-broker's "Guided Commodities Account Program." All
of plaintiffs' accounts were under the control of one trader, and the
investors could not withdraw their funds for at least eighteen
months. The total capital available and the buying power amassed
by control over the group of accounts enabled the broker to
123. Id. at 275. The court denied recovery for failure to fulfill the registration require-
ments of § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
124. 457 F.2d at 277.
125. 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974).
126. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977). Other earlier decisions applying the horizontal com-
monality approach and holding that the disputed discretionary account did not constitute a
security include McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (E.D. La. 1972),
aff'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973), Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61, 63-65
(M.D. Pa. 1973), and Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129, 131 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
127. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981). See also Mullis
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1351-52 (D. Nev. 1980);
Alkan v. Rosenthal & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Com. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 120,797,




purchase more efficiently and thus generate greater profits. 128 De-
spite these indicia of financial interdependence, the court held that
no common enterprise existed because the investment vehicle
neither pooled the funds nor distributed the profits pro rata.129
Emphasizing the investor's dependence on his broker and the
control the broker exercises over all trading, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that vertical commonality creates a common enterprise capa-
ble of satisfying the second requirement of the Howey test in the
securities case SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises.3 0 The court
defined a common enterprise as an arrangement "in which the for-
tunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the
efforts and successes of those seeking the investment or of third
parties." 131 The Fifth Circuit adopted the Glenn W. Turner defini-
tion in another securities case, SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 1 2 and ruled that the disputed pyramid scheme constituted an
"investment contract." The Koscot court stressed in dictum that a
pooling of funds of a number of investors was not necessary to sat-
isfy the common enterprise requirement. s33
The Fifth Circuit extended the Koscot rationale when, in SEC
v. Continental Commodities Corp.,'" it held that certain discre-
tionary accounts in commodity futures contracts constituted secur-
ities. The discretionary trading accounts at issue were independent
of one another, and brokers made all recommendations as to which
futures contracts to buy or sell. Stressing the lack of knowledge of
futures trading on the part of the investors, the court determined
that the success of the investments depended directly on the ex-
128. 622 F.2d at 220.
129. Id. at 222-23.
130. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
131. Id. at 482 n.7. In Glenn W. Turner, the court found that self-improvement con-
tracts which offered the purchaser the opportunity of selling similar contracts to others and
earning commissions constituted "investment contracts." The court emphasized that the ef-
forts of the managers were essential to the success of the scheme, although the purchasers
were involved in the solicitations.
132. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). Koscot involved a pyramid scheme of multi-level
distributorships for selling cosmetics, wherein each investor realized profits only when those
he solicited enlisted as distributors.
133. The court stated,
the fact that an investor's return is independent of that of other investors in the
scheme is not decisive. Rather, the requisite commonality is evidenced by the fact that
the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy of the Koscot meetings
and guidelines on recruiting prospects and consummating a sale.
Id. at 479.
134. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
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pertise and advice of the brokers. ' ss The court held that because
the vertical relationships between individual customers and their
brokers constituted a "common enterprise," the discretionary ac-
counts were "investment contracts" and, therefore, recovery under
the securities laws was warranted.3 s
The Ninth Circuit later reconsidered the vertical commonality
standard it had pronounced in Glenn W. Turner and limited the
instances in which discretionary accounts in commodity futures
may be classified as investment contracts. In Brodt v. Bache &
Co.2s7 the plaintiffs opened a discretionary account with the defen-
dant brokerage house at the suggestion of one of its registered rep-
resentatives. After their broker left the employ of Bache, the plain-
tiffs learned that all of their money had been lost. The court
recognized that the success or failure of such an investment vehicle
was certainly affected by the individual broker's ability,138 but it
determined that a relationship sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of a vertical common enterprise did not exist between the
plaintiff and the defendant brokerage house. The court stated,
"Merely furnishing investment counsel to another for a commis-
sion, even when done by way of a discretionary commodities ac-
count, does not amount to a 'common enterprise.' "13 9
The absence of a precise definition of a vertical relationship
that will satisfy the common enterprise requirement has led the
district courts into predictable confusion. Some courts, without ar-
ticulating the vertical commonality rationale, have determined that
the relationship created when the investor relinquishes all control
to his broker satisfies the common enterprise requirement of
Howey.14 0 The Brodt decision indicates, however, that more than a
control and dependence relationship between a customer and his
broker may be necessary to constitute an investment contract even
135. Id. at 522.
136. Id. at 521-23.
137. 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
138. Id. at 461.
139. Id. at 462.
140. See, e.g., Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871-73
(D. Utah 1981) (second element of Howey test met, but not third element, rendering the
account nondiscretionary); Rochkind v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254, 256-57 (D.
Md. 1975). See also Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486, 487-90 (S.D. Iowa
1974) (emphasis on "pooling" of investors' funds is too strict or literal a definition of "in-
vestment contract"); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764,
765-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a thorough
discussion of these earlier cases, see Hodes & Dreyfus, supra note 120.
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in those jurisdictions adhering to the vertical commonality
approach.
B. Exclusive Jurisdiction of the CFTC
Aside from the dispute concerning whether a commodity fu-
tures account is a security, the 1974 grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to the CFTC over futures and discretionary accounts in futures 41
may also present an obstacle to an investor seeking recovery under
the federal securities laws. It is generally agreed that the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CFTC preempts the SEC and the states from
regulating trading vehicles in commodity futures which may also
constitute securities. 42 It is disputed, however, whether the savings
clause, 43 which preserves judicial jurisdiction, permits the institu-
tion of private liability actions based on securities claims. The
courts have not adopted a uniform approach to the issues raised by
the exclusive jurisdiction provision. Many decisions have ignored
the jurisdiction issue and focused exclusively upon whether a dis-
cretionary account is a security and what relief is available, 44 and
other decisions have summarily dismissed securities claims involv-
ing commodities, relying upon the 1974 grant of exclusive juris-
diction as a bar to collateral relief.14 5 Only a few courts have at-
tempted a detailed analysis of the preemption question." 6
Several compelling arguments support the position of some
courts that the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC bars all claims
under the federal securities laws. First, courts have argued that by
vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the CFTC Congress acknowledged
141. For text of this provision, see note 47 supra.
142. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
143. For text of the savings clause, see note 50 supra.
144. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981); Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523
(5th Cir. 1978); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
145. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 499
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co.,
470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507 (D. Utah
1976). For cases holding that the CFTC's "exclusive jurisdiction" preempts state securities
laws, see International Trading, Ltd. v. Bell, 262 Ark. 244, 556 S.W.2d 420 (1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); Birenbaum v. Bache & Co., Inc., 555 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977).
146. Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1981);
Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Nev. 1980); Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706 (E.D. La. 1978); Hofmayer
v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See generally Saitlin, supra note
8; Johnson, supra note 46, at 32-36.
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the inherent differences between securities and commodity futures
markets that warrant their separation. 147 Essentially, the securities
market is a capital raising device in which investment decisions are
formulated upon an appraisal of the particular company's manage-
ment, financial status, and future prospects. 48 The commodity fu-
tures market, on the other hand, is a price stabilization mechanism
that ensures the availability of a commodity at a fixed price in the
future. 49 Second, the CFTC itself has asserted that the 1974
Amendments vested it with exclusive jurisdiction over commodity
futures accounts, which are "beyond the jurisdiction of any other
state or federal agency."150 Third, the CFTC has proposed to
amend its antifraud rules, which currently parallel the language of
rule lOb-5,151 in order to avoid the application of certain securities
principles that it deems inappropriate in the commodity futures
context. 15 2 Fourth, the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments
pertaining to the savings clause, although sparse, can be inter-
preted to support the preemption of private liability claims under
the federal securities laws.1 53 Last, some courts have contended
that because the 1974 Amendments filled the regulatory gap that
previously justified extension of the securities law to private liabil-
ity claims for violations of the CEA, courts no longer need "to at-
tempt to stretch the protection of the securities laws further than
it may legitimately be extended." 1"
At least one district court, however, has held that the grant of
147. Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FurT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,706, at 22,874 (E.D. La. 1978).
148. Id. at n.7. See also Greenstone, supra note 47, at 203-04.
149. See notes 2-8 supra and accompanying text.
150. CFTC INTERPRETATIV LErTER No. 77-2, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur.
L. REP. (CCH) 20,257, at 21,371 (1977).
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
152. The CFTC has expressed particular concern over what it considers the inappro-
priate application of securities disclosure rules in the commodities markets. See, e.g.,
Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Com. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 20,706, at 22,874 (E.D. La. 1978); Greenstone, supra note 47, at 204-05. See generally
Note, Reflections of 10b-5 in the "Pool" of Commodity Futures Antifraud, 14 Hous. L. Rav.
899 (1977).
153. See, e.g., Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co. 459 F. Supp. 733, 736-37 (N.D. Cal.
1978). For a thorough discussion of pertinent excerpts of the legislative history of the 1974
Amendments, see Johnson, supra note 46, at 32-36, where the author notes that in congres-
sional discussions on the savings clause, no one specifically mentioned that the preservation
of court jurisdiction was necessary for the continued adjudication of claims involving com-
modity futures transactions based on violations of the federal securities laws. Id.




exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC does not preclude judicial appli-
cation of securities laws in all disputes involving discretionary fu-
tures accounts. In Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. 15 the court acknowledged that regulation of commod-
ity futures by any other agency is undeniably preempted. The
court, however, reasoned that the savings clause specifically re-
tained court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal stat-
utes."8 6 The court cited portions of the legislative history of the
1974 Amendments relevant to the exclusive jurisdiction provision
and the savings clause which, in its opinion, supported the distinc-
tions between agency and court jurisdiction and between claims
arising under the securities statutes and those arising from viola-
tions of rules and regulations.1 57 The court summarized its reason-
ing as follows:
The legislative history... very clearly makes the issue of court jurisdic-
tion independent of the issue of agency jurisdiction. The over-all concept re-
vealed in the language of the statute and the legislative history is: (1) The
Commodity Exchange Act preempts any other federal or state statute dealing
with commodity futures trading; (2) The jurisdiction of the CFTC preempts
all other agency regulation in the commodities field, even regulation of a se-
curity, so long as the dominant purpose for the existence of the security is to
trade in commodity futures; (3) The federal courts, however, specifically re-
tain jurisdiction to decide cases arising under federal statutes. Therefore, the
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear private liability claims based on the
federal securities acts.158
C. Analysis
The circuit courts remain split on whether the federal securi-
ties laws provide an implied private right of action for investors in
the commodity futures market.1 59 The inadequate and inefficient
procedures under the CEA present a compelling reason for a broad
155. 492 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Nev. 1980).
156. Id. at 1349-51. See also Bromberg, supra note 107, at 795.
157. "Under the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the [CFTC], the authority in the
[CEA] (and the regulations issued by the [CFTC]) would preempt the field insofar as fu-
tures regulation is concerned." 492 F. Supp. at 1350 (quoting H. &. REP. No. 1383, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
158. 492 F. Supp. at 1350-51 (footnotes omitted); accord, Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F.
Supp. 337, 344 (N.D. Ga. 1980). But see Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733,
737 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bromberg, supra note 107, at 795 n.28.
159. One commentator stated,
So far, the few courts that have considered whether there is still a securities cause
of action for a commodity security interest have said "no." But those are lower courts
and they [have not], in my mind, grappled very fully with the issue. I consider this still
to be an open question.
Bromberg, supra note 107, at 795.
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interpretation of an "investment contract" in order to allow a de-
frauded commodities investor a fair opportunity for redress. Yet,
the inequity of an administrative procedure does not by itself jus-
tify extensive expansion of the securities law. Nevertheless, in
some situations commodity futures investment vehicles warrant
treatment under the federal securities law. This remedy, however,
should be available only when a substantial interdependence can
be found between the broker and the investor. In the absence of
such interdependence, recovery should be limited to remedies
under the CEA.
Even in circumstances in which a discretionary account in fu-
tures contracts constitutes a security, some commentators have
suggested that the CFTC's grant of exclusive jurisdiction insulates
the commodity futures trade from interference by the courts or by
other federal agencies.160 The crucial distinctions set forth by the
Mullis court,"61 however, offer a logical framework whereby the
CFTC, the SEC, and the courts may coexist without usurping one
another's jurisdiction. The CEA preempts other agencies from reg-
ulating commodity futures trading vehicles. Preserving judicial ju-
risdiction to hear claims arising under other federal statutes does
not interfere with the CFTC's regulatory domain. Furthermore,
the Mullis rationale recognizes that the CFTC's exclusive jurisdic-
tion does not preclude judicial jurisdiction over violations of the
rules and regulations of other agencies. The Mullis court reasoned
that the statutory/regulatory distinction is "a collateral but neces-
sary corollary to the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC so
that the agency may achieve the clear supremacy [that] Congress
intended."' 62 Thus, a defrauded commodity futures investor whose
trading vehicle is classified as a security should be permitted to
maintain a cause of action under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act if all other requirements of a securities claim are
satisfied. 6" The developm'ent of legal precedent pertaining to dis-
cretionary commodity futures accounts that are securities will not
interfere with the orderly development of legal precedent under
the CEA or the administration of the regulatory scheme by the
CFTC.
The Supreme Court addressed the general issue of maintain-
160. Johnson, supra note 46, at 35; Saitlin, supra note 8, at 246.
161. See notes 155-58 supra and accompanying text.
162. Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1351
(D. Nev. 1980).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
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ing an action under the securities laws when a separate statutory
scheme has been devised to resolve the particular dispute in Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.1 The Court deter-
mined that a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan did not
constitute a "security" under the federal securities laws, noting
that Congress specifically enacted ERISA1 5 to regulate the use
and terms of employee pension plans.
Congress believed that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted
ERISA, a belief which the SEC actively encouraged. Not only is the extension
of the Securities Acts by the Court below unsupported by the language and
history of those Acts, but in light of ERISA it serves no general purpose.
Whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the Securities
Acts are now provided in more definite form through ERISA. ' "
While demonstrating the existence of an important policy to pre-
vent extension of the securities laws when a separate regulatory
system exists to deal with a particular kind of interest, it is impor-
tant to note that the Court's holding was based on a finding that
noncontributory, compulsory pension plans were not "securities."
The discretionary account in commodity futures, however, can be
classified as a "security," at least in the "pooling" situation.
Daniel, therefore, does not contradict this Note's conclusion that
commodity futures investment vehicles which can be classified as a
security deserve treatment under the securities laws.
Among those courts that have allowed commodity futures in-
vestors an implied right of action under the securities laws, the
definition of a common enterprise necessary for designating a trad-
ing vehicle a "security" is far from consistent.167 Neither those
courts that require a pooling of investor funds nor those at the
other extreme that find the simple vertical relationship between
broker and investor sufficient have reached an acceptable solution.
The Continental Commodities1 5 application of the vertical com-
monality analysis is an unwarranted expaneon of the definition of
an "investment contract" as a security. The court's emphasis on
investor dependence and broker discretion ignores the commonal-
ity requirement of the Howey test. The Milnarik1 69 horizontal re-
quirement, on the other hand, represents an unwarranted restric-
164. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
165. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
166. 439 U.S. at 570 (citations omitted).
167. See notes 104-40 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 134-36 supra and accompanying text.
169. See notes 122-24 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of the Howey common enterprise test. Because it recognizes as
investment contracts only those accounts in commodity futures in
which investors have pooled their funds, Milnarik overlooks cer-
tain discretionary accounts that logically should be classified as in-
vestment contracts. Moreover, the Milnarik horizontal commonal-
ity approach arguably not only obscures the flexible meaning of an
"investment contract" intended by the Howey court, but also may
thwart the fundamental purpose of the federal securities law: In-
vestor protection.
The Brodt70 decision may have approached a more acceptable
interpretation of the "common enterprise" requirement. The court
recognized that both the vertical and the horizontal components of
an investment contract may contribute to the finding of a common
enterprise. While acknowledging the importance of the relation-
ship between broker and investor, the court realized that more
than a strong vertical interdependence is necessary to satisfy the
Howey common enterprise standard.
Appellant's [investor's] enterprise was a "solitary" one. His profits were
shared neither with other investors nor the appellee [brokerage house];
whether his investment flourished or perished was unrelated directly to either
the general financial health of the appellee or the ability of the appellee to
perform a duty, the purpose of which would be "to secure" to some extent
the appellant's investment. Merely furnishing investment counsel to another
for a commission, even when done by way of a discretionary commodities
account, does not amount to a "common enterprise.'
7
'
Congress expressly designed the administrative remedy of the
CEA to provide an avenue of relief for the defrauded commodity
futures investor within the CFTC procedural framework. The in-
clusion of the savings clause in the CEA indicates a congressional
awareness that some commodity futures investment devices are
subsumed under the existing securities statutes and case law, and
therefore, qualify as securities subject to judicial jurisdiction. Of
course, Congress may choose to preclude relief under the federal
securities laws after sunset review in 1982. Congress, however,
should avoid causing a sudden halt to relief under the securities
laws without the simultaneous reformation of CFTC procedures to
facilitate the equitable disposition of claims. Until Congress acts to
strengthen the currently ineffective CFTC, courts should, in appro-
priate situations, be open to implying a private right of action
under the securities laws in order to effectuate the intent of the
170. See notes 137-39 supra and accompanying text.
171. Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1978).
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CEA: Protection for the commodity futures investor. 17 2
IV. IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ACT
A. Pre-1974 Cases
Notwithstanding the absence of an express private right of ac-
tion for the defrauded commodity futures investor, prior to the
passage of the 1974 Amendments many courts permitted a right of
action 17 3 under various CEA provisions, particularly the antifraud
provision. Section 4b of the CEA1 ' makes it unlawful for a mem-
ber of a contract market to cheat, defraud, or willfully deceive any
person in connection with the making or sale of a commodity fu-
tures contract, and thus prohibits the common instances of fraud
perpetrated by a broker upon his customer: Misrepresentation,
conversion, churning,1 75 and other unauthorized transactions. In
addition, an analogous antifraud provision applies to commodity
trading advisors and commodity pool operators.17 6
Decided in 1967, the first reported case holding that a private
right of action may be implied under the antifraud provision of the
CEA was Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co. 177 Goodman addressed the
claims of two commodity investors who alleged that their broker-
172. Although the treatment of commodity futures contracts under the securities laws
is generally beneficial to customers and is endorsed by this Note in limited circumstances,
certain complications may arise. For example, classification of a trading vehicle as a security
may necessitate registration under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976),
unless an exemption can be found. See Saitlin, supra note 8, at 244-45. Commodity dealers
might also be forced to comply with state securities laws and regulations. Id. at 246-47. The
costs of compliance with all state and federal securities rules would be high. Moreover, pos-
sible state restrictions, such as the imposition of minimum capitalization requirements for
commodity pools, would decrease the attractiveness of commodity futures as investment
vehicles. Id. at 247.
173. Private rights of action do not require express statutory authorization. Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). "[C]ourts may impose civil liability to aid the imple-
mentation of a statutory policy by compensating victims and deterring wrongdoers." Note,
Private Rights of Action for Commodity Futures Investors, 55 B.U. L. REv. 804, 815 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
174. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976). For text of the antifraud provision of the Commodity
Exchange Act, see note 35 supra.
175. For a definition of churning, see note 14 supra. See also Johnson v. Arthur
Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 765-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
176. Commodity Exchange Act § 40, 7 U.S.C. § 60 (1976 & Supp. 1m 1979). For a
definition of "commodity trading advisor," see note 62 supra. For a definition of "commod-
ity pool operator," see note 63 supra. Section 40 applies to all commodity trading advisors
and commodity pool operators, whether or not they are registered under the Commodity
Exchange Act.
177. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. IM. 1967).
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dealer had defrauded them. Relying on section 286 of the Restate-
ment of Torts,178 the court determined that complainants were
members of the class of persons that Congress intended to protect
by enacting section 4b of the CEA and that violation of that sec-
tion constituted a tort for which the investors had a federal rem-
edy, although none was specifically provided in the CEA e17  The
Goodman court asserted that private rights of action may be im-
plied unless the legislation at issue demonstrates a contrary in-
tent, s0 and found no indication in the CEA that Congress did not
intend to allow defrauded commodity futures customers to recover
damages. Goodman has thus become a leading case for the pro-
position that an implied cause of action for an injured commodity
futures investor exists under the CEA. 18
In 1973 the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to decide
whether Congress had implicitly authorized a private damages ac-
tion under the CEA. Determining that the plaintiff customer could
recover damages against a board of trade and some of its members
for manipulating the frozen pork bellies market, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co.,"82 applied the statutory
tort rationale of Goodman and its progeny to imply a private right
of action under section 9b of the CEA, a criminal provision that
prohibits price manipulation. The Supreme Court, however, re-
versed, holding that the case should have been stayed pending a
determination by the Commodity Exchange Commission.' 8 Thus,
178. Violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act makes the actor
liable for an invasion of the interest of another if: (1) the intent of the enactment is
exclusively or in part to protect the interest of the other as an individual; and (2) the




181. Many courts have cited Goodman for this proposition. See Deaktor v. L.D.
Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529, 534 (7th Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v.
Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973) (per curiam); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d
132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076, 1084
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61, 65 (M.D. Pa.
1973); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1343 (E.D. La. 1972); United Egg
Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 437 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn. 1968).
182. 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414
U.S. 113 (1973) (per curiam).
183. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113, 114-16 (1973) (citing Ricci v.
Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 305-07 (1973)) (deferral of suit involving antitrust
1376 [Vol. 34:1349
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
the Court, by invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,'"
avoided the issue of implied rights under the CEA.
The extensive revisions of the 1974 Amendments created un-
certainty about the continuing validity of a private right of action
under the CEA. 18 5 Specifically, the reparations remedy8 8 and the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC to adjudicate disputes under
the CEA1e7 arguably overrule pre-1974 judicial precedent that per-
mitted private rights of action under the CEA. In order to resolve
the dispute, it first must be determined whether Congress created
reparations as an exclusive or a supplementary dispute settlement
technique. Concomitantly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 88
may require that the injured commodity futures investor first in-
voke the reparations process before seeking redress in the courts.
Furthermore, an examination of the possible existence of a judicial
method of recovery must take into account recent Supreme Court
restrictions on implied rights of action. 189
B. Implication Analysis-The Cort Test
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak'90 the Court implied a private right
of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934' e' in favor of a corporate stockholder who alleged that a false
and misleading proxy statement had tainted a merger. The Court
emphasized the need for a private remedy to achieve the underly-
ing purpose of the statute. The Court, however, tempered the ex-
violations by a board of trade to the Commodity Exchange Commission, the forerunner of
the CFTC).
184. The doctrine provides, in very general terms, that
when Congress has created an administrative agency to regulate within a particular
sphere, and a complaint raises issues which lie within the sphere of regulation and
require the special competence of the agency, state and federal courts are without juris-
diction to grant relief until these issues have been determined by the agency.
Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285,
295 (1963).
185. A court must apply the law as it exists at the time of its decision. United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 110 (1801). Therefore, in considering the implication
issue under the Commodity Exchange Act, the 1974 Amendments to the statute rather than
pre-1974 case law must govern. For a discussion of the 1974 Amendment, see notes 41-52
supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 60-86 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 141-158 supra and accompanying text.
188. See note 184 supra.
189. See notes 190-214 infra.
190. 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964).
191. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
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pansive approach of Borak in Cort v. Ash'192 when it developed a
method for evaluating whether a federal statute includes an im-
plied private right of action. Instead of examining the need for or
the underlying purpose of a statute in the Borak tradition, the
Cort analysis stressed the language and structure of the statute at
issue in view of the circumstances surrounding its passage.
193
The test formulated in Cort contains four components, each
incorporated from prior holdings of the Court.
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted"--that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a rem-
edy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally rele-
gated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?' "
The Court observed that the evaluation of implied rights is espe-
cially difficult because when a statute does not expressly include or
abolish a private damages cause of action, the accompanying legis-
lative history rarely provides any conclusive indication of congres-
sional intent. To resolve the ambiguity, the Court, in effect, cre-
ated a presumption in favor of an implied right to be used when
evaluating statutes that clearly confer certain rights upon a class of
persons. In such situations, the Court suggested that while a right
could be implied in the absence of a showing of an intent on the
part of Congress to create a private remedy, a demonstration of an
express, contrary intent would be determinative.1
95
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have refined the Cort
implication analysis. For example, in Cannon v. University of Chi-
192. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The issue before the Court was whether a private cause of
action for damages against corporate directors could be implied in favor of a corporate
stockholder under 18 U.S.C. § 610, as amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (repealed 1976). Section 610 was a
criminal provision prohibiting corporations from making a contribution or expenditure in
connection with any election at which Presidential electors will be chosen.
193. For a discussion of the development of the Supreme Court implication analysis in
Cort, see Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell
Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VA1m. L. REv.
1333 (1980).
194. 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 82. The Court concluded that implication of a private cause of action under
18 U.S.C. § 610 was neither suggested by the legislative history nor required to effectuate
Congress' purpose in enacting the statute. In addition, the statutory provision was not
directed at internal relations between corporations and their stockholders. Moreover, the
cause of action alleged was traditionally relegated to the states. Id. at 79-85.
1378 [Vol. 34:1349
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
cago196 the Court implied a private right of action under section
901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,197 which
bans sex discrimination in certain federal financial aid programs.
Initially, the Court noted that a violation of a federal statute that
results in harm to an individual does not automatically give rise to
a private action for damages; rather, the existence of a private
remedy is a question of statutory construction. 19 Clarifying the
threshold question of the Cort inquiry, 99 the Court stressed that a
plaintiff urging an implied right of action must be a member of the
specific class that the statute was enacted to protect.2 00 In addi-
tion, the Court indicated that it would be difficult to imply a rem-
edy under a statute enacted for the benefit of the general public,
such as a criminal statute.20 1 Moreover, the Court found that an
examination of the legislative history of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 revealed ample evidence of congressional intent to
create a private cause of action for violations of the discrimination
provision.20 2 Although indicating that Congress should expressly
create private remedies when it intends them, the Court neverthe-
less concluded that the failure of Congress to expressly provide a
private cause of action was not inconsistent with an intent to make
private remedies available.2 3 Justice Powell, however, convincingly
asserted in dissent that it was doubtful that "Congress absent-
mindedly forgot to mention an intended private action. '20 4
During the same term, the Court elaborated on the second
196. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The complaint in Cannon was brought by a female applicant
against two medical schools that denied her admission.
197. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901(a), 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a) (1976)).
198. 441 U.S. at 688.
199. See text accompanying note 194 supra.
200. 441 U.S. at 689-94.
201. The court said,
There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons
if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited
class, had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal
funds or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to educational insti-
tutions engaged in discriminatory practices.
Id. at 690-93.
202. Furthermore, the Court stated that the legislative history demonstrated that Ti-
tle IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976),
and that it was expressly assumed that Title IX would be enforced in the same manner as
Title VI, under which courts had implied a private remedy for victims of discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, or national origin. 441 U.S. at 694-703.
203. Id. at 717.
204. Id. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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prong of the Cort test-the congressional intent requirement-in
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.20 5 Reluctant to imply a private
right in the face of congressional silence, 0 8 the Court denied the
existence of a cause of action for damages under a disclosure provi-
sion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.207 The Court stressed
that the proper inquiry concerned the question of congressional
intent-not "whether [the] Court thinks that it can improve upon
the statutory scheme. '20 8 Emphasizing that the implication analy-
sis focused on whether Congress intended, explicitly or implicitly,
to create a private damages action, the Court indicated that appli-
cation of the last two elements of the Cort test was unnecessary
when no such legislative intent could be found. 09
The Court further limited the Cort analysis in Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis.21 0 Affirming the princi-
ples of Cannon and Touche Ross, the Court declared that congres-
sional intent to create a private right of action was the dispositive
issue. 1 1 Although implying a private remedy to void an investment
adviser's contract, the Court held that no implied cause of action
exists under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,12
which proscribes certain fraudulent and deceptive conduct. In the
latter determination the Court considered the effect of express
provisions within the statute for judicial and administrative en-
forcement of section 206 in light of the elemental canon of statu-
tory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius-"[w]hen a
statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes
205. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Touche Ross the trustee of an insolvent brokerage firm
brought suit alleging that its auditors had conducted an improper audit.
206. "[I]mplying a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a
hazardous enterprise, at best." Id. at 571.
207. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 17a, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976). Section 17a
requires broker-dealers to keep such records and reports as the SEC deems necessary.
208. 442 U.S. at 578.
209. Id. at 575-76.
210. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). In Transamerica a shareholder of a real estate investment
trust filed shareholder derivative and class action suits, alleging that certain of its trustees,
its investment adviser, and two corporations affiliated with the latter were guilty of various
frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty in violation of certain provisions of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, §§ 201-220, 54 Stat. 847 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1
to -20 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979)).
211. 444 U.S. at 15-16, 24.
212. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 206, 54 Stat. 852 (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976)), makes it unlawful for investment advisers "to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . ; to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;" or to
engage in various transactions without making required disclosures.
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the negative of any other mode." 213 The Court expressed a willing-
ness to yield to persuasive evidence of contrary legislative intent,
but found that the evidence of congressional intent militated
against implying a private remedy for monetary damages. In addi-
tion, the Court inferred that the more comprehensive the express
remedies under a statute, the less likely a need for an implied pri-
vate right of action will be found.2 14 The clear trend of the
Supreme Court, as demonstrated by Cannon, Touche Ross, and
Transamerica, is to adopt an increasingly restrictive approach to
implying rights under federal statutes.
C. Post-1974 Cases
Against the background of the innovative 1974 Amendments
and the Supreme Court's restrictive implication analysis, the lower
courts have adopted four distinct and inconsistent approaches to
the resolution of whether an implied private right of action exists
under the CEA.215
1. The Hutton and Bartels Approaches
A few courts have merely presumed that a private right of ac-
tion is still valid without addressing the 1974 Amendments or the
Cort test. The district court in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Lewis,216 for
example, recognized that courts have consistently implied a private
cause of action under the Act, but made no reference to the Cort
decision. The plaintiff in Hutton was denied recovery because the
alleged offenses were not actionable under the CEA's antifraud
provision.2
A second approach, typified by Bartels v. International Corn-
213. Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929), quoted in 444
U.S. at 20.
214. 444 U.S. at 20.
215. A four-part categorization of these cases was suggested by the court in Curran v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 233 n.25 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
216. 410 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Goldman, 593 F.2d 129, 133 n.7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979);
Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1176 (2d Cir. 1977);
Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 103 n.8 (7th Cir. 1977); Poplar Grove
Planting & Ref. Co., v. Bache Halsey Stuart Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585, 589-90 (M.D. La. 1979).
217. 410 F. Supp. at 419, 422. In E.F. Hutton a securities dealer filed a complaint
against one of its account executives, seeking recovery of losses suffered by a customer as a
result of the broker's allegedly improper and unauthorized transactions in pork belly fu-
tures. The court held that the broker had sold short without authorization but that such
conduct was not a "manipulative device" prohibited under § 6b of the CEA. Id. at 422.
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modities Corp.,218 has held that while the 1974 Amendments do
not extinguish the previously acknowledged implied right of action,
a plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before
resorting to the courts. The district court in Bartels determined
that a defrauded commodity options customer has no private right
of action under the CEA before he pursues the CFTC's reparations
process. 21 9 Finding that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction22' con-
trolled, the Bartels court found no need to fully explore the con-
tinuing validity of an implied right of action under the CEA or to
consider the Cort test.22 1
The Hutton and Bartels approaches to the question whether
an implied private right of action exists under the current CEA are
both unconvincing and unsupported by sound legal analysis. The
procedures introduced in the 1974 Amendments and the analysis
announced in the Cort decision so changed the complexion of the
dispute that their impact must be addressed before any conclusion
may be reached as to the validity of a private remedy under the
CEA.
2. The Reenactment Approach-Implying a Right of Action
Applying the Cort analysis, a third line of authority holds that
Congress' reenactment of the CEA without expressly prohibiting
the continued implication of a private right of action indicates im-
plicit congressional approval of the implied action. Courts that
adopt this reenactment approach find the first element of the Cort
test-whether the plaintiff is a member of the specific class that
Congress intended to protect-easily satisfied. These courts begin
their analysis with the language of the CEA itself, and find in its
antifraud provision, section 4b,22 a broad proscription against
cheating, defrauding, or willfully deceiving any person in connec-
tion with the making or sale of a commodity futures contract.
Therefore, these courts find that the intention to benefit commod-
ity futures customers is apparent on the face of the statute.2 2
218. 435 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1977). The complaint in Bartels alleged fraud in con-
nection with commodity options, which are also within the scope of § 2(a)(1) of the CEA, 7
U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. III 1979). For a definition of a commodity "option," see note 82 supra.
219. 435 F. Supp. at 870.
220. For an explanation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, see note 184 supra.
221. 435 F. Supp. at 870. See also Consolo v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes,
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
222. For text of § 4b of the CA, 7 U.S.C. § 66 (1976), see note 35 supra.
223. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 304-07 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub noma. New
York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
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Moreover, the courts read the legislative history of the 1974
Amendments to support the contention that Congress intended the
CEA to protect individuals investing in commodity futures.224
Turning to the second Cort element, the courts following the
reenactment approach phrase their inquiry as whether the legisla-
tive history of the 1974 Amendments indicates a congressional in-
tent to deny or nullify the previously recognized judicial rem-
edy.2 ' Because a judicially created private cause of action
preceded the 1974 Amendments and because the existence of the
implied right had been repeatedly brought to the attention of Con-
gress, these courts argue that Congress' reenactment of the statute
coupled with the absence of a declaration rejecting the precedent
indicates implicit approval of a private cause of action.2 6
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 233-34 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971
(1981).
224. For relevant citations from the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments, see
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 305-07 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nor. New York
Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
225. For instance, the court in Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981), phrased its
inquiry as "whether [Congress] intended sub silentio to alter the significance that had long
been given these provisions by making other changes in the [CEA]." Id. at 303.
226. Id. "Congress was well aware that a number of federal courts had implied a pri-
vate right of action under the [CEA]. If it had wanted to abrogate this right of action,
Congress would have expressed this intention in some way." Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp.
871, 878 (D.N.J. 1980).
The court in Leist cited passages from the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments
to support its contention that Congress was aware of and intended to preserve a previously
implied private cause of action for damages. Included among these passages are remarks by
Professor Schotland of Georgetown University, a commodities law expert, who expressed the
opinion that private claims were available under the CEA. 638 F.2d at 310 (construing
Hearings on S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837, and H.R. 13,113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agri-
culture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 205, 737, 746 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on S. 2485]). The court also cited the comments of a grain exchange representative who
proposed that contract markets be required to submit to arbitration only those claims that
would otherwise constitute an "economic impediment to [c]ourt litigation." Id. (construing
Hearings on S. 2485, supra, at 415). In addition, the court quoted a Kansas City Board of
Trade spokesman who had unsuccessfully argued for legislation to protect exchanges "from
unnecessary and costly defenses of lawsuits" brought under the CEA. Id. (quoting Hearings
on S. 2485, supra, at 317). The Leist court also cited the remarks of Rep. Poage, Chairman
of the House Conference Committee, who, during debates on the 1974 Amendments, had
stated that "when the [CEA] was enacted, courts implied a private remedy for individual
litigants in the [CEA]." Id. at 308 (quoting 119 CONG. Rac. 41333 (1973)). The Second Cir-
cuit relied on Poage's statement to explain why new legislation creating a central adminis-
trative agency was required at that time: to compel exchanges to adopt or change certain
rules because the threat of private litigation had caused the exchanges to shirk this respon-
sibility. Id. at 309.
Additionally, several courts have cited passages from the House Report, which indi-
cated that the threat of private damages suits was in part responsible for the decreased
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In order to reach this conclusion, the courts that imply a pri-
vate right of action under the CEA have cited the canon of statu-
tory contruction that creates a presumption that the reenactment
of a statute in substantially the same form incorporates previous
judicial and administrative interpretations of the statute, includ-
ing decisions of the lower courts as well as the Supreme Court.2
Thus, by assuming congressional cognizance of prior case law ac-
knowledging an implied judicial remedy, the absence of any indica-
tion of legislative intent to abrogate a private cause of action per-
mits these courts to infer that Congress intended for the implied
private right of action to survive the passage of the 1974 Amend-
ments. The courts then place the burden of proof on those who
effectiveness in the system of exchange regulation, to support their contention that Congress
was aware of an implied private right of action.
In the few years this provision has been in the present [CEA], there is growing evi-
dence to indicate that, as opposed to strengthening the self-regulatory concept in pre-
sent law, such a provision, coupled with only limited federal authority to require the
exchanges to make and issue rules appropriate to enforcement of the Act-may have
actually have worked to weaken it. With inadequate enforcement personnel the Com-
mittee was informed that attorneys to several boards of trade have been advising the
boards to reduce-not expand exchange regulations designed to insure fair trading,
since there is a growing body of opinion that failure to enforce the exchange rules is a
violation of the Act which will support suits by private litigants.
Id. at 308 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1974) (emphasis in original).
The report later mentioned that one of the specific problems brought to its attention was
the "[g]rowing difficulties ... [that have developed] as a result of private plaintiffs seeking
damages against... the markets." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48
(1974)). Several courts have suggested that the House Report, which did not express dissat-
isfaction with a private right of action, focused instead on the reduction of rulemaking on
the exchanges. Id.; Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 231
n.21 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp.
105, 109-10 (N.D. I. 1979).
Courts following the reenactment approach have also cited portions of the legislative
history pertaining to the institution of the reparations procedure and the addition of the
judicial savings clause to support their assertion that Congress was aware of an implied
private right of action. See notes 239-243 infra.
227. When "Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of prior law, Congress
normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorpo-
rated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581
(1977), cited in Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 303, 310-11 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub
nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981). "Congress is presumed to
have been aware of existing constructions of statutes and does not intend to overrule them if
the provision is re-enacted in substantially the same form." Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 234 n.27 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Alabama Ass'n of Ins.
Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976)), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
228. Van Vranken v. Helvering, 115 F.2d 709, 710 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
585 (1941), cited in Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 310, cert. granted sub nom. New York
Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
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assert that no private right exists to demonstrate a congressional
intent to change prior law. The courts that follow this approach, of
course, find that no such showing can be made.2 2 '
The Second Circuit's majority opinion in Leist v. SiMplot23 0 is
representative of the reenactment approach. In Leist, plaintiffs
sought recovery for damages allegedly arising out of the sellers' de-
fault on a May 1976 potato futures contract. Plaintiffs asserted
that the antifraud and antimanipulative provisions of the CEA cre-
ated an implied private right of action and thereby conferred juris-
diction upon the court to adjudicate their claim. The court empha-
sized both the longstanding judicial recognition, beginning with
Goodman,3 1 of an implied private right of action and the Supreme
Court's holding in Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor.2 2
The Leist majority noted that the Deaktor circuit court had relied
upon the existence of an implied remedy under the antifraud pro-
vision of the CEA in finding a similar remedy under the provision
prohibiting price manipulation. '3" Therefore, Leist suggested that
the Supreme Court had reversed the Deaktor lower court merely
because the Court believed that an initial factual determination by
the Commodity Exchange Commission 23 4 of whether an exchange
rule had been violated would assist later courts hearing similar
claims. Furthermore, according to Leist, the Court never expressly
declined to decide the issue of an implied private right of action,
but instead assumed that such a remedy could be implied under
both the antifraud and antimanipulation provisions as the Seventh
Circuit had previously held.2 35
To reconcile the continued existence of an implied cause of
action with the various changes in the statutory scheme of the
229. See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 303 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub
noma. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981). The Leist court, for exam-
ple, suggested that if Congress had intended to alter a principle of law established by the
judicial branch, either the statute or its legislative history would have expressly abrogated
the judicial precedent. Id. Conversely, "[w]hen a principle has become settled through court
decisions, there is no occasion for Congress to speak unless it wishes a change." Id.
230. 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v.
Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
231. See notes 177-81 supra and accompanying text.
232. 414 U.S. 113, revd per curiam, Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529
(7th Cir. 1973). See notes 182-84 supra and accompanying text.
233. In Deaktor the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Circuit should have stayed
the civil suit and deferred to the primary jurisdiction of the Commodity Exchange Commis-
sion. See notes 182-84 supra and accompanying text.
234. The case was referred to the Commodity Exchange Commission, the predecessor
of the CFTC. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
235. 638 F.2d at 300-01.
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CEA accomplished by the 1974 Amendments, the reenactment ap-
proach emphasizes the permissive language se of the reparations
procedure and views it as a supplementary rather than an exclu-
sive remedy. Thus, according to this view, an injured commodity
futures investor is not obligated to pursue the reparations process
prior to or in lieu of judicial remedies. ' 7 The Leist court distin-
guished the creation of an administrative remedy under the CEA
from other cases in which application of the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius precluded implication of a judicial
remedy.
The case differs fundamentally from instances ... where Congress, operating
on a tabula rasa, provided a new duty and certain express remedies to en-
force that duty, and the Court applied the maxim expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius. When as here Congress adds a new remedy to enforce a preex-
isting duty, where other remedies had been clearly recognized, it would be
expected to say so if it meant the new remedy to be exclusive.""
Thus, according to the reenactment approach, congressional si-
lence should be interpreted as approval. Furthermore, these courts
have found support within the legislative history of the 1974
Amendments for their conclusion that Congress created the repa-
rations procedure as an additional remedy.23 9
236. "Any person complaining of any violation of any provision of this chapter...
may, at any time within two years after the cause of action accrues, apply to the [CFTC]."
Commodity Exchange Act § 14(a), 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the reparations process, see notes 60-73 supra and accompanying text.
237. See 638 F.2d at 312-13; Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
622 F.2d 216, 234 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981); Alken v. Lerer, 485
F. Supp. 871, 879 (D.N.J. 1980); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 113-14 (N.D. Ill. 1979);
R.J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 466 F. Supp. 345, 347-48 (N.D. IlM. 1979). See
generally Rosen, supra note 68.
238. 638 F.2d at 312-13 (citations omitted).
239. For instance, the Leist court cited certain remarks of Senator Talmadge:
The vesting in the [CFTC] of the authority to have administrative law judges and ap-
ply a broad spectrum of civil and criminal penalties is likewise not intended to inter-
fere with the courts in any way. It is hoped that giving the [CFTC] this authority will
somewhat lighten the burden upon the courts, but the entire appeal process and the
right of final determination by the courts are expressly preserved.
638 F.2d at 313 (quoting 120 CONG. Rac. 30459 (1974)). The court in Smith v. Groover, 468
F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1979), referred to remarks made by Senator Huddleston during floor
debates:
Thus, an aggrieved commodity customer will be able to obtain more expeditious treat-
ment of his claim should the customer elect to pursue a claim in reparations rather
than proceed to arbitration or pursue in court the private right of action which has
been judicially implied for violations of certain provisions of the [CEA], or which in the
future courts may recognize for other provisions of the Act.
468 F. Supp. at 114 (quoting 124 CONG. REc. S.10,537 (daily ed. July 12, 1978)).
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Addressing the exclusive jurisdiction provision,240 the reenact-
ment line of cases contends that Congress intended only to estab-
lish CFTC supremacy over the SEC and other potential regulators
of transactions involving commodity futures, and, therefore, did
not intend to limit the ability of the courts to hear disputes arising
from violations of the CEA.2 41 These cases read the savings clause
and the legislative discussions of its purpose as providing addi-
tional support for the assertion that Congress intended to preserve
court jurisdiction. Leist, for example, stated that when the legis-
lative history is coupled with "Congress' recognition that jurisdic-
tion over private causes of action have been held to have been con-
ferred, the conclusion that Congress desired their continued
240. For text of the exclusive jurisdiction provision, see note 47 supra. See also notes
141-58 supra and accompanying text.
241. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 314-15, cert. granted sub nom. New York Mercan-
tile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 232 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981); Jones v. B.C.
Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 218-19 (D. Kan. 1979).
242. For text of the savings clause, see note 50 supra. The Leist majority cited several
portions of the legislative history relevant to the adoption of the savings clause. Testimony
given during Senate hearings postulated that reparations coupled with the CFTC's exclusive
jurisdiction might unintentionally result in repeal of the previously recognized private ac-
tion for damages. "Unfortunately. . . section 201 [exclusive jurisdiction] may prohibit all
court actions. The staff of the House Agriculture Committee has said this was done inadver-
tently and they hope it can be corrected in the Senate." Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 315
(2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Hearings on S. 2485, supra note 226, at 205 (remarks of Sen.
Clark)), cert. granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
Professor Schotland suggested that if the reparations process were added, a provision should
also be included containing "explicit language ... that Federal and State courts are still
open if a complainant prefers to go to trial there." Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 2485, supra
note 226, at 737). The Leist majority also noted that in his testimony before the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Representative Rodino expressed concern that the
exclusive jurisdiction provision, standing alone, might prohibit state courts from exercising
jurisdiction over claims arising under state commercial law and might "oust even federal
courts of jurisdiction." Id. at 314 (quoting Hearings on S. 2485, supra note 226, at 260). He
suggested an amendment to "define the jurisdiction, including antitrust jurisdiction, of fed-
eral courts for commodity transactions." Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 2485, supra note 226,
at 259-60).
The Leist majority cited various explanations offered for adopting the savings clause
provision to demonstrate congressional intent to preserve judicial jurisdiction.
[T]he conferees wished to make clear that nothing in the act would supersede or limit
the jurisdiction presently conferred on courts of the United States or any State. This
act is remedial legislation designed to correct certain abuses which Congress found to
exist in areas that will now come within the jurisdiction of the CFTC.
Id. at 315 (quoting 120 CONG. Rac. 34997 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge), 120 CONG.
RC. 34737 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage)). Moreover, the Senate Report stated that the
savings clause was inserted to "make clear that... Federal and State courts retain their
jurisdiction." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974)).
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recognition is nigh irresistible. '243
Several courts that subscribe to the reenactment approach
have held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not determi-
native of the implication question. For example, in Curran v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.2 44 the Sixth Circuit found
that resort to the CFTC's reparations process was unnecessary be-
cause private suits would not interfere with an orderly develop-
ment of precedent or the administration of the regulatory scheme
by the CFTC.245 The court also stated that the adjudication of
claims of broker fraud as opposed to claims concerning more com-
plex legal and factual issues, such as price manipulation, did not
require the special expertise of the CFTC for a just resolution.2 6
Another argument advanced by the reenactment approach is
that great deference should be accorded the CFTC opinions that
recognize the continued existence of an implied private right of ac-
tion.2 47 The district court in Smith v. Groover2 48 emphasized the
CFTC's consistent interpretation of the reparations section as per-
mitting commodity investors an election of forums in which to seek
relief. In Alken v. Lerner249 the district court noted that the CFTC
considered inappropriate the application of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction to private actions in fraud, although the commission
recognized that issues of regulatory policy should be deferred to
agency determination.2 5 0 The Leist majority stressed the CFTC's
243. 638 F.2d at 315.
244. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct 1971 (1981). In Curran,
plaintiffs sought damages from defendant brokerage house for alleged false representations
by its agents who had induced them to open discretionary trading accounts in commodity
futures in defendant's "Guided Commodities Account Program." Id. at 219-20.
245. Id. at 235-36; accord, Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 121-22 (N.D. IlM. 1979);
Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 738 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
246. 622 F.2d at 236. See also Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871, 881-82 (D.N.J. 1980).
247. "[T]he consistent construction of a statute 'by [the] agency charged with its en-
forcement is entitled to great deference by the courts.'" Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871,
882 (D.N.J. 1980) (quoting United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 752
(1977)); accord, Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 321 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub noma.
New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981). See also
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-08 (1979).
248. 468 F. Supp. 105, 115 (N.D. IlM. 1979); accord, Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346
(1981).
249. 485 F. Supp. 871 (D.N.J. 1980). In Alken plaintiff sought recovery for losses re-
sulting from the raising of the margin requirement of his account without his knowledge.
250. The CFTC has said,
[P]rivate litigation seeking damages for alleged violations of provisions of the Act will
rarely, if ever, involve issues appropriate for review by the [CFTC] under the doctrine
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admission that its inadequate resources prevented it from policing
all commodity related transactions. The Leist court also cited the
CFTC's acknowledgement that private damages actions would be
helpful in carrying out the statutory purpose of investor
protection.25 1
The courts that follow the reenactment approach interpret the
failure of Congress to pass any of three bills2 52 introduced in 1973
that provided for an express private right of action as supportive
of their conclusion that an implied right of action survived the
1974 Amendments. The Alken court contended that the failure of
legislation in Congress is not always a reliable indicator of con-
gressional intent.25 3 Instead, the Alken court theorized that be-
cause each bill provided for treble damages, a remedy previously
unavailable to claimants suing under the antifraud provision of the
CEA, their rejection by Congress merely indicates reluctance to ex-
pand the parameters of the damage award rather than evidence of
an express intent to nullify an implied private right of action.
2
"
The Leist court suggested that the bill's rejection might be the re-
sult of a congressional belief that sufficient remedies already
existed.25 5
While recognizing that subsequent legislation is of very
limited weight in ascertaining Congress' intent in enacting earlier
laws,256 the reenactment approach views the parens patriae provi-
of primary jurisdiction. The judicial resolution of a private fraud action, for example,
requires only the application of specific statutory standards to the particular conduct
alleged. The issues raised by a particular fraudulent scheme, however complicated, are
entirely within the conventional utility of the courts to resolve and should therefore
not occasion referral to the [CFTC].
Statement of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Concerning Referrals of Private
Litigation Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 41 Fed. Reg. 18,471, 18,472 (1976),
quoted in 485 F. Supp. at 881. See also Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
622 F.2d 216, 236 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
251. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 321 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. New
York Merantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
252. H.R. 11195, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 17(3) (1973); S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 505
(1973); S. 2378, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 20(3) (1973). For a brief description of these bills, see
Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1356 (D. Nev.
1980).
253. 485 F. Supp. at 877 (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979)).
254. Id.
255. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 318 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. New
York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).




sion,'  adopted in 1978,258 as some evidence of Congress' intent to
adopt an additional judicial remedy. The Leist and Alken courts
suggested that the inclusion of state enforcement powers do not
indicate congressional intent to abrogate the existing private dam-
ages action; instead Congress sought to protect commodities inves-
tors from the growing incidence of fraud in other than the regu-
lated contract markets15 and to affirm the power of the states to
enforce their own contract and consumer laws.26 0 Accordingly,
these courts argue that the legislative history of the exemption of
contract markets from the parens patriae provision is further indi-
cation of congressional awareness of the implied private right of
action available to the investor in a contract market."6 1 The Leist
majority noted that the sunset review26" of the CFTC in 1978 pri-
marily focused on the creation of the parens patriae remedy and
did not purport to revise the CEA as extensively as the 1974
Amendments. Therefore, the Leist majority contended that despite
possible congressional awareness of a few district court decisions
denying the existence of an implied right, the limited scope of the
1978 Amendments foreclosed any opportunity to expressly create a
private right of action under the CEA.268
In addition, the reenactment line of cases have relied on the
general judicial recognition of implied causes of action under pro-
visions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2" The majority in
Leist noted that the Supreme Court did not deem the existence of
an implied private right of action worthy of extensive debate in its
review of damages suits alleging violations of the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws.2 6 The securities statutes con-
257. Commodity Exchange Act § 6d, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (Supp. 11 1979). See note 56
supra and accompanying text.
258. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979)).
259. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 319-20; Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. at 878.
260. See Commodity Exchange Act § 6d(5), 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(5) (Supp. m 1979).
261. Leist quoted from the legislative history.
The exemption from State suits provided to contract markets is justified due to the
deterrent effect on contract markets caused by [CFTC] regulation, institution of
[CFTC] enforcement proceedings, and the implied private rights of action that may be
brought against those contract markets that fail to discharge their duties under the
[CEA].
638 F.2d at 320 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. S.16527 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)) (emphasis
supplied).
262. See notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
263. 638 F.2d at 319-21.
264. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. m 1979).
265. 638 F.2d at 297. A discussion of securities case law on this point is beyond the
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tain a variety of other remedies-civil fines, criminal penalties, and
express action-which are at least as extensive as those included in
the CEA. Thus, the Leist court suggested that Congress might
have justifiably assumed that courts would follow securities law
precedents in this area and, accordingly imply a private right of
action under the CEA.266
Furthermore, the reenactment approach insists that the re-
strictive trend of the Supreme Court's implication analysis267 did
not become apparent until Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon in
1979.268 In the four years between the Cort and Cannon decisions,
the majority in Leist noted that the federal appellate courts had
implied private rights of action in no less than twenty instances.6 9
The Leist court pointed out that the Supreme Court's refusal to
imply a private cause of action in favor of plaintiffs in such cases
as Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores270 and Piper v. Chris-
Craft Industries2 1 resulted from its findings that the plaintiffs did
not fall within the protective ambit of the federal securities laws.
The Leist court further emphasized that any indication of a se-
verely limiting trend could not have been perceived "by anyone
reading the Court's opinions without an exceedingly high powered
magnifying glass."27' Therefore, when reviewing the CEA in 1974,
Congress was most likely unaware of this "well-publicized" restric-
tive approach.2 3
Having thus demonstrated to their own satisfaction the requi-
site congressional intent, the courts following the reenactment ap-
proach conclude that the third prong of the Cort analy-
sis-whether a private right of action is consistent with the
underlying statutory scheme-is easily satisfied. Arguing that the
legislative history of the 1974 Amendments demonstrates congres-
sional intent to continue a private cause of action for damages,
these courts conclude that implication of a judicial remedy is natu-
scope of this Note.
266. Id. at 297-98.
267. See notes 335-41 infra and accompanying text. See generally notes 167-214 supra
and accompanying text.
268. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 303 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
269. " ' In the four years since we decided Cort, no less than 20 decisions by the Courts
of Appeals have implied private actions from federal statutes."' 638 F.2d at 320 (quoting
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 741 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
270. 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
271. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
272. 638 F.2d at 321.
273. Id. at 320.
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rally compatible with investor protection.27 4 The courts argue that
providing an aggrieved futures investor with an election of alterna-
tive remedies-reparations, arbitration, and private suits-may de-
ter future fraudulent activities on the part of the broker275 and
thus promote a fair and honest environment for commodity futures
trading, a principal goal of the CEA27 6
Finally, the reenactment approach finds that the fourth re-
quirement of the Cort test-whether an implied private right in-
fringes upon an area of traditional state concern-presents no ob-
stacle to a finding of an implied right. The regulation of
commodity futures trading has been considered a federal matter
since the first federal legislation enacted nearly sixty years ago.277
Thus, the courts find ample support for their conclusion that a pri-
vate right of action is implicit under the CEA. Although the re-
enactment approach dutifully addresses the Cort test, another line
of authority has employed the Cort framework and concluded that
no basis exists for an implied private right of action under the
CEA after the passage of the 1974 Amendments.7 8
3. The Strict Construction Approach-No Right of Action
The fourth, and final, line of authority applying the Cort test
to determine whether an implied right of action exists under the
current CEA has found that the private right did not survive the
1974 Amendments. This strict construction approach concedes
that the first element of the Cort test is met-commodity futures
274. See, e.g., id. at 321; Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622
F.2d 216, 233-34 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
275. See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 321; Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971
(1981); Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871, 878 (D.N.J. 1980); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp.
105, 115 (N.D. M11. 1979).
276. For text of the current purpose provision of the CEA, see note 38 supra.
277. See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 322; Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 235 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981);
Navigator Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 416, 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871, 878 (D.N.J. 1980); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp.
105, 115 (N.D. IMl. 1979).
278. See, e.g., Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for
cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No. 80-1542); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d
at 323-56 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
622 F.2d 216, 237 (6th Cir. 1980) (Phillips, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971
(1981); Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1981);
Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Nev. 1980);
Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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investors are included within the ambit of the CEA's protection. 79
Addressing the issue posed by the second element required by
Cort, these courts have phrased their inquiry into the legislative
history as whether there is any evidence of an explicit or implicit
intent to create or approve an implied private cause of action
under the CEA. Unable to satisfy themselves that Congress ex-
pressed an affirmative intent to create an implied private right of
action, these courts conclude that no such remedy should be im-
plied.80 Unlike the Curran and Leist courts, the Fifth Circuit, in
Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co. 28 1 discerned no congressional intent to
approve or create a private cause of action in its examination of
the legislative history.
Stated charitably, we are less certain than ... several of our sister
courts that these few fleeting references-sometimes cryptic and all compara-
tively isolated among the hundreds of pages of testimony and debate that
comprise the legislative history of the 1974 [Amendments]-are sufficient to
establish that the entire Congress was even aware of and duly considered the
existence of any previously inferred cause of action in its deliberations and
vote upon the [1974 Amendments]. ...
Nonetheless, even assuming that these remarks demonstrate Congress'
awareness of the prior judicial recognition of an implied right under the CEA
* . . these passages unquestionably give no indication that Congress approved
of and intended to perpetuate such actions as a part of the elaborate express
enforcement scheme that it was in the process of fashioning.282
The strict construction approach, therefore, expressly rejects
279. See, e.g., Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 782 n.13 (5th Cir. 1980), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No. 80-1542). See also Leist v.
Simplot, 638 F.2d at 326 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (questions whether plain-
tiffs are within the ambit of the antimanipulative provisions).
280. See, e.g., Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 781-86 (5th Cir. 1980), petition
for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No. 80-1542). See also Leist v. Sim-
plot, 638 F.2d at 323-25 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Curran v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 237 (6th Cir. 1980) (Phillips, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
281. 634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Mar.
10, 1981) (No. 80-1542).
282. Id. at 786 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); accord, Leist v. Simplot, 638
F.2d at 327 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1353-58 (D. Nev. 1980). These opinions construe the same
portions of legislative history discussed in notes 226, 239, and 242 supra and accompanying
text.
The Rivers court relied upon SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119-23 (1978), in which the
Supreme Court rejected the contention of the SEC that its construction of § 12K of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had been virtually incorporated into that section by Con-
gress' reenactment of the provision in substantially the same form. The Sloan Court was
reluctant "to presume general congressional awareness of the Commission's construction
based only upon a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative docu-
ments." 634 F.2d at 786 n.20 (quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978)).
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the premise of the reenactment approach that the absence of evi-
dence of intent to deny or nullify a judicial remedy indicates con-
gressional approval of an implied private right of action. Instead,
the strict construction approach requires affirmative proof that
Congress intended to confer jurisdiction of the CEA not only to
the CFTC but also to the judicial branch. Thus, the Rivers court
and the Leist dissent emphasized that, without evidence of clear
congressional intent, attempts by the courts to create a private
right equal judicial legislation. 8
The courts that follow the strict construction approach criti-
cize the reenactment approach's reliance on Goodman.28' Judge
Mansfield, dissenting in Leist, determined that Goodman was
wrongly decided in light of Cort and its progeny and the then ex-
isting law.285 According to Judge Mansfield, the statutory tort ra-
tionale used in Goodman to imply a federal remedy on behalf of a
defrauded customer is now an outmoded analysis.286 The rationale,
he stated, failed to meet even the less rigorous then prevailing Su-
preme Court standards established in J.L Case Co. v. Borak,28 7
which required a showing of the necessity of a private right of ac-
tion to effectuate the statutory purpose.288 Moreover, he claimed
that the proposition asserted in Goodman, that an implied private
remedy is inherent unless Congress evinced a contrary intention,
lacks support in case law.289 Because Goodman is a relatively re-
cent case, Judge Mansfield determined that cases following its
holding do not constitute a "longstanding" history upon which to
base a presumption that Congress intended for an implied private
283. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 327 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citing Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); Rivers v. Rosenthal
& Co., 634 F.2d at 781-82 n.11.
284. See notes 177-81 & 231 supra and accompanying text. See generally Frankhauser
& Selig, supra note 98.
285. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 341 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The Rivers court
stated that while
the correctness of these decisions is dubious when measured against the present wis-
dom for determining the existence of implied rights of action... this course of al-
lowing the victims of violations to take the initiative and hail their trespassing tormen-
tors before the courts was basically consistent with that era's fundamental approach of
relying principally upon the self-policing of the futures trade by those involved in it.
634 F.2d at 779 (citations omitted).
286. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 324, 341, 356 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); see notes
177-81 supra and accompanying text.
287. See notes 190-91 supra and accompanying text.
288. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 341-42 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 341.
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remedy to survive the 1974 Amendments. '90 The Leist dissent
challenged the majority's contention that the Supreme Court's re-
versal of Deaktor supported the implication of a private right of
action under both the antifraud and antimanipulative provisions 91
and criticized their interpretation as logically inconsistent with the
Court's decision not to decide either issue.29 '
The strict construction analysis asserts that it is inappropriate
to apply the reenactment doctrine to the passage of the 1974
Amendments to find congressional intent to continue an implied
private right of action29 because the doctrine is merely an aid to
statutory construction, not a conclusive presumption or rule of
substantive law.294 The Rivers court noted that as a canon of con-
struction, the doctrine is applicable to the interpretation of stat-
utes reenacted in substantially the same form. Although many of
the substantive provisions of the CEA, including the antifraud sec-
tion, were virtually unchanged, the court determined that the 1974
Amendments did not constitute a mere reenactment, but rather
were a dramatic revision of the regulatory scheme.295 Examples of
the changes in the CEA cited by the Rivers court include the ex-
pansion of the scope of the statutes beyond agricultural futures,29
the extensive reform of the regulatory oversight and enforcement
systems evidenced by the creation of the CFTC, the shift in em-
phasis from exchange self-regulation to affirmative federal respon-
sibility for commodity futures legislation, 9 and, most importantly,
the creation of the arbitration and reparations procedures.29 8 The
Rivers court stated, "So significant a transfiguration of the extant
statutory framework is, itself, a wholesale obliteration of the prior
status quo and sufficient reason for declining to adopt plaintiffs'
analytical approach, grounded as it is in the reenactment doctrine
290. Id. at 340. Goodman was decided in 1967.
291. Id. at 343; see notes 182-84 & 233-35 supra and accompanying text.
292. Judge Mansfield questioned the practice of inferring a rule of law from a Su-
preme Court opinion when the Court had expressly chosen not to consider the issue. 638
F.2d at 343 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
293. See notes 225-29 supra and accompanying text.
294. See Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 783 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert.
filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No. 80-1542).
295. Id. at 783-84.
296. Id. at 780. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
297. 634 F.2d at 780. See also notes 42-52 supra and accompanying text.
298. 634 F.2d at 784-85. See, e.g., Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,





Consistent with the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alter-
ius, the Rivers court held that the creation of the arbitration and
reparations procedures resulted in a presumption against implying
a private damages suit.300 Citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis,"o the Rivers court insisted that clear proof
of an affirmative congressional intent both to allow an implied
right of action and to provide the express remedies is required to
rebut the presumption.30 2 Similarly, the court in Mullis v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.303 asserted that because arbi-
tration and reparations were unavailable under the Investment Ad-
visers Act but available under the CEA, there was less reason to
imply a private right of action under the CEA than there was in
Transamerica, a case in which the remedy was denied. The courts
following the strict construction approach have also intimated that
the express remedies are sufficiently broad and varied to preclude
the necessity and utility of an implied right of action.30 These
courts have also suggested that it is unlikely "that Congress ab-
sentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." 0 5
The dissent in Leist maintained that Congress was under no duty
to state that the remedies it provides in a statute are exclusive.308
Addressing the savings clause added by the 1974 Amend-
ments, the Rivers court contended that the language of the provi-
sion fails to demonstrate an intent to preserve an implied right of
action, and criticized the reliance of the reenactment approach
upon speculative legislative history.307 Instead, the strict construc-
tion approach contends that Congress did not intend the savings
clause to dilute the CFTC's grant of exclusive jurisdiction. The
Mullis court determined that Congress included the savings clause
299. 634 F.2d at 784.
300. Id.
301. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). See notes 210-14 supra and accompanying text.
302. 634 F.2d at 784-85; accord, Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 340 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101
S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
303. 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1355-56 (D. Nev. 1980).
304. See, e.g., Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 55-56 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
305. E.g.; id. at 56 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
306. 638 F.2d at 324 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citing T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States,
359 U.S. 464 (1958)). See also Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d at 784 n.16.
307. 634 F.2d at 787. In a footnote, the court also observed that "a provision such as
that in § 2, which explicitly directs the retention of jurisdiction, need not also denote the
retention of an individual cause of action." Id. at n.25.
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to ensure that all proceedings pending at the time of the 1974
Amendments, both investigations and court actions, could continue
without interference.30 8 Both Mullis and Fischer v. Rosenthal &
Co.309 indicated that at least one purpose of the savings clause was
to guarantee appellate jurisdiction to review reparations deci-
sions.310 Alternatively, the dissent in Leist suggested that the
clause may have been inserted to preserve federal court jurisdic-
tion over antitrust claims and state court jurisdiction over contract
claims.311 Citing Touche Ross, the Leist dissent also noted that as
a jurisdictional provision, the savings clause could not provide the
basis on which to presume or preserve an implied right of action. 12
The strict construction approach rejects the deference the re-
enactment approach accords to the opinions of the CFTC that ac-
knowledge the continued existence of a private damages action.s s
Citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,1 the Rivers court observed
308. 492 F. Supp. at 1356. "[S]ection 412 (§ 2) was included in the bill to make clear
that all pending proceedings, including ongoing investigations, as well as court proceedings,
should continue unabated by any provision of the [1974 Amendments]. This also is neces-
sary in order to prevent the creation of any regulatory gaps." 120 CONG. Rxc. 34997 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Talmadge), cited in 492 F. Supp. at 1356 n.21.
309. 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
310. Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 492 F. Supp. at 1356; Fischer v.
Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. at 57. "It is hoped that giving the [CFTC] this authority will
somewhat lighten the burden on the courts, but the entire appeal process and the right of
final determination by the courts are expressly preserved." 120 CONG. REC. 30459 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Talmadge), cited in Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 492
F. Supp. at 1356 n.22; Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. at 57.
311. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 351 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield
cited the following remarks of Rep. Rodino:
Many of the millions of commodity futures contracts are presently enforceable in State
courts under recognized commercial law and contract principles. This double proviso
could, in effect, deprive State courts of their current jurisdiction. There does not ap-
pear to be any legislative intention or established need to achieve this pre-emption ....
In addition, this double proviso could possibly be read as an attempt to oust even
federal courts of jurisdiction.... That such a result was not intended in the House is
readily apparent from the House action striking the original antitrust exemption provi-
sion: antitrust laws are to apply to commodity transactions and, of course, federal
courts play an instrumental role in promoting as well as protecting the national policies
expressed already in the antitrust laws.
Hearings on S. 2485, supra note 226, at 259-60, cited in 638 F.2d at 351 n.21 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
312. 638 F.2d at 352-53 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). "The source of plaintiffs' rights
must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the [Act] which they seek to en-
force, not in the jurisdictional provision." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
577 (1979), cited in 638 F.2d at 352-53 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
313. See notes 247-51 supra and accompanying text.
314. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). In Piper the Court refused to imply a private right of action
under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because the plaintiff, an unsuccessful
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that the Supreme Court had ignored the urgings of the relevant
agency when dealing with the implication issue under a provision
of the securities statutes.3 15 In Piper the Court recognized that the
SEC's interpretation of the federal securities laws deserved some
deference, but in determining whether a private cause of action
could be implied, a matter peculiarly reserved for judicial resolu-
tion, the SEC's expertise was of little value.318 Similarly, the Leist
dissent noted that in the past the Court had declined to invoke the
administrative deference rule even when the SEC's opinion sup-
ported the Court's conclusion. 1 7 Therefore, the dissent in Leist in-
ferred that the CFTC's position on the implication issue was not
determinative.318
Another persuasive argument proffered by the strict construc-
tion approach emphasizes the failure of Congress to expressly pro-
vide a private damages action in 1974 and 1978. The rejection in
1974 of three bills,319 each granting a private right of action, consti-
tuted "clear evidence" to the Mullis court and the Leist dissent of
congressional intent to repudiate such a remedy.32 0 Moreover, the
Mullis court reasoned, if the treble damages provision contained in
each bill was objectionable, it could haye been deleted without
having to reject the entire measure. 21 In addition, by 1978 Con-
gress was aware that several courts had denied the existence of im-
plied damages suits under the CEA and could have instituted an
express right of action had it so desired. The only judicial remedy
Congress enacted in response, however, was the parens patriae
clause.2  Enactment of the statutory cause of action for state en-
forcement further supported the contention of the Leist dissent
that "wten Congress intended to create a right of action under the
tender offeror, was not included within the protective ambit of the statute.
315. 634 F.2d at 783 n.14; accord, Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 331 n.4 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
316. 430 U.S. at 41 n.27 (1977).
317. 638 F.2d at 331 n.4 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
318. Id.
319. See note 252 supra and accompanying text.
320. Leist v. Sinplot, 638 F.2d at 345 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Mullis v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. at 1356; accord, Fischer v. Rosenthal &
Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (N.D. Tex. 1979). The Rivers court, however, stated that no clear
indication of Congress' intent could be discerned from its failure to enact any of the three
proposed bills. 634 F.2d at 788.
321. 492 F. Supp. at 1356.
322. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 353 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Mullis v. Merrill




[CEA] it did so expressly, not by implication. 3 23
The Rivers court, acknowledging that views of subsequent
Congresses are entitled to less weight than the enacting Congress
when examining the intent behind a statute,'2 ' noted that remarks
of at least two legislators in 1978 indicate their awareness of an
implied private cause of action under the 1974 version of the
CEA.3 25 The court determined, however, that other portions of the,
legislative history of the 1978 Amendments evidence the absence
of such an awareness throughout Congress.32 e First, a Senate report
listing investor protections under the CEA contained no mention
of an implied private cause of action.2 7 Second, the Rivers court
noted that the parens patriae provision provided for exclusive ju-
risdiction in the federal courts whereas no similar provision can be
found in the CEA generally. The court stated that "it would be
anomalous indeed for Congress to require exclusive jurisdiction
only of these relatively infrequent suits by states while continuing
to countenance an implied cause of action, without such a restric-
tion, for any individual who cares to sue." 23 Therefore, the court
inferred that no individual causes of action were contemplated by
Congress in 1974.329
The strict construction approach attacks the analogy drawn by
the reenactment approach between implied rights under the CEA
and those under the federal securities laws.330 First, no "longstand-
ing" history of an implied right can be found under the antifraud
provision of the CEA, unlike the twenty-five year history of lower
courts implying a private cause of action under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act.331 Second, although the
federal securities laws contain express remedies, there exists no ad-
ministrative proceeding similar to reparations in which to recover
323. 638 F.2d at 354 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). See also Mullis v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. at 1357.
324. 634 F.2d at 789 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980)).
325. Id. at 790 n.30 (citing 124 CONG. REc. 10,537 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Huddle-
ston), 124 CONG. REc. S16,527 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Leahy)).
326. Id. at 790.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 791.
329. Id. at 791-92.
330. See notes 264-66 supra and accompanying text.
331. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). See Leist v. Sinplot, 638
F.2d at 343 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971)).
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compensatory damages. 2  Therefore, because the express remedies
under the securities laws are punitive and remedial, they are less
complete than the compensatory remedies under the CEA, and any
analogy between the judicial history of private rights under the
two regulatory schemes is, therefore, of limited relevance.333 Last,
unlike the CEA, the Securities Exchange Act grants general juris-
diction over "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to en-
force any liability or duty."33
Recognizing that statutory construction must be based on the
law in effect at the time of their decision,3 5 several courts have
stressed the Supreme Court's recent restrictive approach towards
implying private rights of action under federal statutes.3 8 Citing
National Railroad Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK) v. National Asso-
ciation of Railroad Passengers83 7 and Transamerica, the courts
following the strict construction approach have noted the reluc-
tance of the Supreme Court to imply a private suit to recover dam-
ages under a statute containing express remedial provisions and
have adopted the Court's rationale that the granting of judicial re-
lief in such situations is unnecessary to fulfill the statute's pur-
pose.3 8 The Mullis court indicated that, in light of Touche Ross
and Transamerica, a high level of proof of satisfaction of the con-
gressional intent element of the Cort test is necessary.3 39 The Leist
dissent advised that mere speculation of congressional intent was
totally unsatisfactory and must be avoided.4 0 Justice Rehnquist's
332. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 344 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
333. Id.
334. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
335. See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 325 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citing Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 77 (1975)).
336. E.g., 638 F.2d at 325 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d at 237 (Phillips, J., dissenting); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. at 1354; Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp.
53 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
337. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). In Amtrak, the Court refused to imply a private cause of
action to challenge the discontinuance of train service under § 307(a) of the Rail Passenger
Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 547 (1976), which confers enforcement powers upon federal
district courts on petition of the U.S. Attorney General.
338. "The courts, in adopting a restrictive approach to the implication of private ac-
tions, should pay particular attention to whether the private remedy is necessary to effectu-
ate Congressional goals." Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F.
Supp. 1345, 1354 (D. Nev. 1980). See also Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 333 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 55 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
339. Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. at 1355.
340. "Extrapolations based on gossamerthin fabric, requiring speculative assumptions
as to Congress' intent are to be avoided. To rely upon such weak inferences is to indulge in
judicial legislation." 638 F.2d at 327 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). See also Curran v. Merrill
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concurring opinion in Cannon succinctly summarizes the current
trend of the Supreme Court:
Not only is it "far better" for Congress to so specify when it intends private
litigants to have a cause of action, but for this very reason this Court in the
future should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such
specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch.""
Once a court concludes that no clear affirmative congressional
intent to either approve or create an implied private right of action
under the CEA has been demonstrated, no further consideration of
the Cort test is necessary. 4 2 The Mullis and Fischer courts, how-
ever, addressed the third element of the Court's implication analy-
sis-whether a private right of action is consistent with the under-
lying statutory scheme-and concluded that the CFTC's
enforcement powers and the existence of the administrative repa-
rations procedure are inconsistent with an implied private rem-
edy.3 43 The Rivers court acknowledged that an implied private
right of action would be helpful and consistent with the investor
protection purpose of the CEA, but it noted that Congress also in-
tended for the 1974 Amendments to create a "uniform regulatory
structure" to develop a coherent and consistent body of law. View-
ing the implication of a private damages suit as a potential barrier
to achieving this congressional objective, the Rivers court stressed
that the courts should be especially reluctant to imply a private
right of action in the face of congressional silence when the promo-
tion of one statutory purpose would disserve another.u4
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 237 (6th Cir. 1980) (Phillips, J., dissent-
ing), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
341. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring), cited in Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 237 (6th
Cir. 1980) (Phillips, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
342. Transamerican Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 22-24
(1979).
343. Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. at 1357;
Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. at 57.
344. Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d at 791 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti-
nez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978)); accord, Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 492 F.
Supp. at 1357.
The fourth prong of the Cort analysis-whether the cause of action would infringe upon
an area traditionally of state concern-can be resolved rather easily by the strict construc-
tion approach, and has received little attention by these courts. In Rivers, the defendants
conceded that commodities regulation was traditionally a matter of federal concern, and the
court did not discuss the issue further. 634 F.2d at 782 n.13. The Fischer court conducted a
perfunctory examination of the issue and concluded that it had no relevance. 481 F. Supp.
at 57. Neither the Mullis court, the dissent in Curran, nor the dissent in Leist gave any
consideration to the fourth factor.
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D. Analysis
The second element of the Cort analysis-whether "there [is]
any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one" 3 4 -is the focal point of the
division between the reenactment and the strict construction ap-
proaches. The nature of the inquiry by each approach determines
the resolution of whether an implied private right of action exists
under the CEA. Because several courts determined that a private
remedy existed prior to passage of the 1974 Amendments, the re-
enactment approach3 40 asks whether the legislative history con-
tains any indication of an intent to abolish the preexisting private
right of action. Conversely, the strict construction approach347 asks
whether the legislative history indicates an intent to create or ap-
prove an implied private right of action. In fact, the sparse and
inconclusive legislative history provides no concrete basis upon
which courts can make a conclusive determination. Each approach
uses the sparcity of the legislative history to its advantage: the re-
enactment approach finds no evidence of an intent to abolish an
implied action and the strict construction approach finds no evi-
dence of an intent to create an implied action.
An examination of recent Supreme Court decisions, however,
indicates that the Curran and Leist majority decisions espousing
the reenactment approach are inconsistent with the Cort analysis
as refined by the Court in Cannon, Touche Ross, and Transamer-
ica. Recent decisions of the Court have made clear that the critical
inquiry into the congressional state of mind is a search for legisla-
tive intent to create a private right of action under the relevant
statute; u 8 the latter part of the second Cort factor--"or to
deny"-is no longer emphazied by the Court. The difficulty of es-
tablishing a congressional intent to create an implied right of ac-
tion is enhanced by the need to resolve several complex issues.
First, at what point does prior judicial precedent reach the status
of a "longstanding" rule of law3 49 in order to place an affirmative
burden upon Congress to expressly overrule it? Second, what
weight is given to whether the "longstanding" precedent is from a
345. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
346. See notes 222-278 supra and accompanying text.
347. See notes 279-344 supra and accompanying text.
348. See notes 202, 209 & 211 supra and accompanying text.
349. While an implied right of action under the securities laws has long been recog-
nized by the courts, see text accompanying notes 104-05 supra, such a longstanding history
of an implied remedy does not exist under the CEA, see text accompanying note 290 supra.
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lower or appellate court? Third, when should remarks by legisla-
tors be considered conclusive? Last, when is it proper for the
courts to establish the dimensions of an implied remedy, such as
the scienter and materiality requirements?...
The courts that would imply a private right of action improp-
erly apply the reenactment doctrine in their attempt to justify the
conceptual leap from a finding of congressional awareness of an ex-
isting private right of action to the presumption that Congress in-
tended for the judicial remedy to survive the comprehensive 1974
Amendments. 51 The inapplicability of the reenactment doctrine is
evidenced by Congress' refusal to reenact a substantially similar
law and its dramatic restructuring of the regulatory scheme to in-
clude administrative procedures to redress aggieved commodity fu-
tures investors. 52 Furthermore, the relatively small number of
lower federal court cases that had unequivocally implied a private
right of action before 1974 does not justify imputing awareness of
this remedy throughout Congress.
The dismissal by Leist and Alken of the importance of Con-
gress' failure to adopt any of the three bills creating a private right
of action 55 is unjustified. Certainly an objectionable treble dam-
ages provision would have been removed if it were the only barrier
to the legislation.854 If the reenactment approach's premise that
Congress was aware of a judicially implied remedy prior to 1974355
is accepted, then it is at least arguable that Congress should have
been prompted to institute an express private right of action in
1978 in order to overrule post-1974 decisions that denied a private
remedy under the CEA. Moreover, the creation of a parens patriae
remedy in 1978 is indication of Congress' recognition that a judi-
cial remedy was warranted in limited circumstances.
In addition to the inherent weaknesses of the reenactment ap-
proach, the logical consistency of the Rivers line of authority de-
mands the conclusion that the strict construction approach offers
the correct analysis. Rivers, Mullis, and Fischer demonstrate a
faithful adherence to the Supreme Court's restrictive approach to-
wards implication analysis by phrasing their inquiry in accordance
with Cannon, Touche Ross, and Transamerica. The strict con-
350. See Note, supra note 184, at 296-97.
351. See notes 225-29 supra and accompanying text.
352. See notes 41-52 supra and accompanying text.
353. See notes 252-55 supra and accompanying text.
354. See notes 320-21 supra and accompanying text.
355. See note 226 supra and accompanying text.
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struction approach is unwilling to find Congressional approval of
an implied right of action from sparse and inconclusive legislative
history.3 56 Consistent with Transamerica, the Rivers court cor-
rectly attributed great significance to the broad enforcement
scheme and express remedies of the 1974 Amendments as indica-
tions of congressional intent not to create a private right of
action. 57
Obvious policy considerations, however, make an implied pri-
vate right of action a desirable and needed remedy under the CEA.
In particular, the inefficient and inadequate procedures currently
available under the CFTC 5 8 encourage courts to provide an alter-
native remedy. The existence of a judicial remedy could conceiva-
bly instill confidence and encourage investors to enter the mar-
ket.35 9 As the number of participants in the commodity futures
market increases, greater price stabilization results and consumers
are thereby protected from sharp price fluctuations. 60 Notwith-
standing the compelling policies that support the implication of a
private right of action, it is improper for the judicial branch to
substitute its judgment for that of the legislative branch in devis-
ing laws. Indeed, the implication of a private remedy without con-
vincing evidence of congressional intent amounts to judicial usur-
pation of the legislative function. Therefore, whatever policy
considerations exist in favor of an implied private right of action
must give way to the courts' constitutionally assigned role.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has explored and evaluated some of the more press-
ing issues in commodities law. In light of the upcoming congres-
sional reauthorization hearings, it is important that the deficiencies
in the current regulatory scheme be discussed and clehrly identi-
fied. Congress should take these discussions into account and act
to refine those areas that have proven the most troublesome to the
defrauded or otherwise injured commodity futures investor.
Congress must address several matters when it considers the
CEA in 1982 under sunset review. First, Congress should remedy
the current deficiencies in the reparations and arbitration proce-
dure. Second, for those circumstances in which commodities fu-
356. See notes 282-83 supra and accompanying text.
357. See notes 295-300 supra and accompanying text.
358. See notes 58-103 supra and accompanying text.
359. Note, supra note 173, at 822-23.
360. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text.
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tures contracts qualify for recovery under the Securities Exchange
Act, Congress should resolve the problem of overlapping SEC and
CFTC jurisdiction. Last, and most important, Congress should
carefully evaluate the enforcement and remedial provisions under
the CEA and determine whether an implied right of action is
warranted.
LISA GOULD DEMARTINm

